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CHOICE AT WORK: YOUNG V. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE,
PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION, AND REPRODUCTIVE
LIBERTY
MARY ZIEGLER†
ABSTRACT
In deciding Young v. United Parcel Service, the Supreme Court has
intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommodation of pregnant workers. Drawing on original archival research, this Article historicizes Young, arguing that the PDA embodied a limited principle of what
the Article calls meaningful reproductive choice. Feminist litigators first
forged such an idea in the early 1970s, arguing that heightened judicial
scrutiny should apply whenever state actors placed special burdens on
women who chose childbirth or abortion.
A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this understanding of reproductive liberty. However, choice arguments rejected in
the juridical arena flourished in Congress, during debate about the PDA.
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and
antiabortion activists turned to legislative constitutionalism to give meaning to the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to
provide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from placing special burdens on women’s procreative decisions.
The history of the meaningful-choice principle suggests that while
the Court reached the right outcome, Young still falls short of providing
women the protection intended by the framers of the PDA. By a 6-3 vote,
the Court vacated a Fourth Circuit decision vindicating United Parcel
Service’s “pregnancy-blind” employment policy—that is, the policy effectively excluded pregnant workers but did not formally categorize
them on the basis of pregnancy. In its application of the McDonnellDouglas burden-shifting analysis, Young removed some of the obstacles
previously faced by pregnant workers relying on disparate treatment theories. However, the Court still assumes that employers could have legitimate reasons for discriminating against pregnant workers beyond their
ability to do a job, creating precisely the kind of burdens on reproductive
decision-making that the PDA was supposed to eliminate.

† Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College
of Law. She would like to thank Courtney Cahill, Kristin Collins, Deborah Dinner, Serena Mayeri,
and Tracy Thomas for agreeing to share their thoughts on this piece.

219

220

DENVER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:1

The history of the meaningful-choice principle strengthens the arguments against pregnancy-blind policies that are available after Young,
including disparate treatment, disparate impact, and disability accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act. Ultimately, however,
the history studied here shows that the promise of litigation after Young
may well still be limited. Legislation, rather than litigation, may be the
most promising path for expanding protections for pregnant women.
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INTRODUCTION
In recently deciding Young v. United Parcel Service,1 the Supreme
Court has intervened in ongoing struggles about when and whether the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) requires the accommoda1.

Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young II), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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tion of pregnant workers.2 In Young, a United Parcel Service (UPS) employee asked for a light-work assignment after her doctor advised her not
to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.3
UPS refused, citing a company policy of accommodating only employees
covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), workers who
lost driving certification from the Department of Transportation (DOT),
or workers injured on the job.4 UPS’s policy stands as a prominent example of the “pregnancy-blind” policies previously approved by many
federal circuit courts—policies that exclude all pregnant workers without
formally classifying on the basis of pregnancy.5 The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Young, transforming the legal landscape surrounding pregnancy-blind policies.6
Drawing on original archival research, this Article historicizes
Young, revealing the promise and limits of the Court’s decision. While
the Court removed some of the practical obstacles in the way of challenges to pregnancy-blind policies, Young still fails to capture one of the
purposes underlying the PDA—preventing employers from placing special burdens on women’s procreative decisions. The PDA embodied a
limited principle of what the Article calls meaningful reproductive
choice—a guarantee that women would have neither special protections
nor special burdens placed on their reproductive decisions. By ignoring
this principle, Young may sometimes allow employers to ignore the
mandate of the PDA.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I situates Young historically,
chronicling the successful legislative constitutional project pursued by
the proponents of the PDA. The idea of meaningful choice embodied in
the PDA first took shape in the early 1970s when feminist litigators argued that heightened judicial scrutiny applied when the State placed special burdens on women either because they chose to bring a pregnancy to
term or to terminate it. More ambitiously, some feminists suggested that
the State may have to act to affirmatively support some fundamental
rights.

2. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title
VII, see Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young I), 707 F.3d 437, 447–51 (4th Cir. 2013), amended and superseded by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, subsequent determination,
2015 WL 2058940 (2015); Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir.
2011); Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006); Spivey v. Beverly Enters.,
Inc., 196 F.3d 1309, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 1999); Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 207–
08 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
3. Young I, 707 F.3d at 441.
4. Id.
5. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6. Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
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A line of Supreme Court decisions completely rejected this understanding of reproductive liberty.7 However, choice arguments rejected in
the juridical arena flourished in Congress during debate about the PDA.
For a variety of strategic and ideological reasons, legal feminists and
antiabortion activists turned to the legislative arena to give meaning to
the idea of reproductive liberty. While not requiring employers to provide any accommodations, the PDA prohibited employers from placing
special burdens on women’s procreative decisions.
As Part I shows, the story of the PDA makes apparent the transformative potential of choice arguments widely derided by academic
commentators. The history presented here reveals the lost potential and
complexity of choice arguments, particularly outside the abortion context. These claims allowed feminists to flesh out the relationship between
poverty and reproductive healthcare. Significantly, such arguments also
helped to build an influential, if troubled, coalition between women on
opposing sides of the abortion issue.
Part II examines the reasons for the decline of meaningful-choice
arguments. Starting in the late 1970s, as abortion opponents scored victories in Congress and the states, and as Ronald Reagan successfully popularized arguments centered on small government and individualism, feminists sought out a more compelling justification for abortion rights. In
the process, commentators and activists highlighted the shortcomings of
framing reproductive rights as a matter of privacy or choice.
Drawing on the history of the meaningful-choice principle, Part III
evaluates contemporary judicial interpretations of the PDA, including
both the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit’s opinions in Young. Prior to
the Supreme Court’s decision in Young, the federal circuit courts generally upheld pregnancy-blind policies—employer rules that excluded
pregnant workers but did not facially discriminate against them.8 In
Young, the Supreme Court rejected both the employer and the employee’s interpretations of the PDA.9 UPS argued that the PDA had nothing
to do with accommodation, simply adding pregnancy to the protected
classes covered by Title VII.10 By contrast, Peggy Young claimed that
7. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322–26 (1980) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to a federal ban on publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478–80 (1977)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to state ban on publicly funded abortions); General Electric Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142–46 (1976) (rejecting a challenge to a pregnancy exclusion under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964), superseded by statute as recognized in General Electric Company
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–97 (1974) (rejecting an
equal-protection challenge to the exclusion of pregnancy in California state disability policy), superseded by statute as recognized in Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669 (1983).
8. For examples of court decisions elaborating on pregnancy-blindness theory under Title
VII, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
9. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–54.
10. Brief for Respondent at 11–12, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12–1226).
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the PDA required employers accommodating any employee to offer
similar protections to pregnant workers so long as they were “similar in
their ability or inability to work.”11 Finding neither interpretation persuasive, the Court focused on how employees could demonstrate disparate
treatment.12 Whereas challenges to pregnancy-blind policies previously
failed at the prima facie case stage,13 under Young, a policy treating
pregnant workers differently from other workers similar in their inability
to work may help a worker make out a prima facie case of discrimination
under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green’s14 burden-shifting framework.15 Young also changed how employees could rebut an employer’s
proffered, neutral reason for discrimination. The Court laid out factors to
balance in evaluating pretext, namely, the burden a policy imposed
against pregnant workers and the employer’s compelling reasons for
exclusion.16 Again, Young makes it easier for pregnant workers to prove
pretext, requiring employers to offer more convincing explanations for
policies that leave out all or most pregnant workers.17
Other scholars have explained how decisions vindicating pregnancy-blind policies ignore the history of the PDA’s antidiscrimination
mandate.18 However, this Article breaks new ground by showing that
Young only partly remedied the errors of lower court decisions on pregnancy-blind policies. The PDA wrote into law an intermovement consensus that reproductive liberty required more than freedom from state interference. To be sure, the PDA only partly embraced the constitutional
commitments of pro-lifers and feminists. The law did not clearly require
11. Petitioner’s Brief at 3–4, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12–1226) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).
12. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1353–55.
13. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas, Making Pregnancy Work Overcoming the Pregnancy Discrimination Act’s Capacity-Based Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15, 36–
37 (2009) (describing court decisions of this kind).
14. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
15. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–55.
16. Id. at 1353–55.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, Accommodating Pregnancy in the Workplace, 25
STETSON L. REV. 1, 27–32 (1995); Deborah Dinner, The Costs of Reproduction History and the
Legal Construction of Sex Equality, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 415, 483–84 (2011) (explaining
that pregnancy blindness arguments do “not recognize two lessons that we may glean from historical
debates about the costs of reproduction”); Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work, and the Promise
of Equal Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 614–15 (2010) (criticizing the pregnancy-blindness line of
cases); Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 49–50; Deborah A. Widiss, Gilbert Redux The
Interaction of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the Amended Americans with Disabilities Act,
46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 961, 978–1004, 1022 (2013). Other studies explore the best legal solutions to
the problem of pregnancy discrimination. See, e.g., Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference The
Case of Pregnancy, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 21–37 (1985) (generally supporting pregnancyspecific benefits); Linda J. Krieger & Patricia N. Cooney, The Miller-Wohl Controversy Equal
Treatment, Positive Action and the Meaning of Women’s Equality, 13 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV.
513, 538–62 (1983) (generally supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1043, 1052–59 (1987) (generally
supporting pregnancy-specific benefits); cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Elyse Rosenblum, Women and the
Workplace Accommodating the Demands of Pregnancy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2214–20
(1994) (proposing an insurance system for pregnancy leave).
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employers to accommodate any employees, including pregnant women.19
Just the same, as this Article argues, if an employer elected to accommodate any worker, the mandate of the PDA made clear that employers had
a duty to provide pregnant women with the accommodations available to
those with a similar physical capacity to work. By requiring only pregnancy-blind policies, the courts have allowed employers to burden women’s reproductive decisions in precisely the way the PDA sought to prevent.
The history considered here supports the outcome in Young, questions core premises of the decision, and strengthens the case against
pregnancy-blind policies in the courts under a variety of theories, including disparate impact and disability accommodation under the ADA.20
Just the same, historical context exposes the limitations of litigating for
pregnant workers. In the future, as in the past, legislation, rather than
litigation, may prove to be a more promising path for women seeking
protection against pregnancy discrimination.
I. CREATING A RIGHT TO MEANINGFUL CHOICE
Young figures centrally not only in the evolving story of employment discrimination law but also in the evolution of arguments about the
meaning of reproductive liberty. In the 1970s, as the Article shows, feminists and certain abortion opponents rallied around an idea of choice at
work, contending that the government could not constitutionally burden
one reproductive choice available to women more than another. By the
end of the 1970s, in cases involving pregnancy, disability, and abortion,
the Supreme Court cast doubt on the validity of this approach, particularly in the context of reproductive liberty.21 At first, it seems that decisions
like Geduldig v. Aiello22 and Maher v. Roe23 hollowed out protections of
19. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 464 (“The text and legislative history of the PDA did
not clarify whether the PDA requires, or even allows, measures beyond equal treatment to accommodate pregnancy and childbirth.”).
20. Under Title VII, disparate treatment cases prohibit intentional discrimination against a
member of the protected class on the part of the employer and her agents. See, e.g., Michelle A.
Travis, The PDA’s Causation Effect Observations of an Unreasonable Woman, 21 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 51, 64 (2009) (“In disparate treatment claims, pregnant women allege that their employers
intentionally took an adverse action against them because of their pregnancy.”). By contrast, disparate impact cases ask whether a facially neutral employment practice has an unjustifiably disproportionate impact on members of a protected class unless that practice is “‘job-related’ and ‘consistent
with business necessity.’” Id. at 70–72 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012)). The ADA
and the Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act (ADAA) mandate that “[n]o covered entity
shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” in hiring, firing, compensation, training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a)
(2012). A “qualified individual” with a disability is one who “with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions” of a job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The ADA and ADAA
require that employers reasonably accommodate their disabled employees as part of its nondiscrimination scheme. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
21. See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
22. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
23. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
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reproductive liberty. Geduldig held that pregnancy discrimination did not
count as sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause,24 while
Maher concluded that states could choose to fund childbirth, but not
abortion, without running afoul of the privacy right recognized in Roe.25
These decisions blocked efforts to flesh out the relationship between
reproductive liberty and equality; Geduldig ratified sex stereotypes surrounding pregnancy and undermined any challenge to them, and Maher
upheld laws banning the use of public monies for abortion, reasoning that
the right to privacy did not entitle women to the means to exercise their
rights.26 These decisions stood in the way of attempts to recognize rights
to state support as well as freedoms from state intervention.27
However, as this Part argues, Geduldig and Maher did not undercut
efforts to secure meaningful reproductive choice. Instead, failures in the
courts forced legal feminists and pro-life activists to express their constitutional commitments in the legislative arena.
This Part charts the evolution of meaningful-choice arguments, beginning with their development in pregnancy disability litigation in the
early 1970s. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe v. Wade,28 feminists developed an argument that substantive due process limited the
State’s ability to burden reproductive decision-making.29 Some went
further, suggesting that in the case of certain crucial rights, the government had to ensure that individuals could effectuate the rights they had.30
As the Part examines next, the Supreme Court ultimately found these arguments unconvincing. Just the same, the Part shows that in the battle for the PDA, pro-life and abortion-rights activists rejected the Court’s
understanding of reproductive privacy, insisting that meaningful choice
existed only when the government protected women from workplace
discrimination and the burdens of poverty. These arguments helped to
shape the PDA and influenced some of its most powerful supporters in
24. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 495–96.
25. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474–75.
26. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 18, at 467 (“The majority opinion in Geduldig reflected an
emerging reluctance, in both the race and the sex contexts, to interpret the constitutional prohibition
on discrimination to reach structural inequality as well as discriminatory intent.”); Sylvia A. Law,
Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 985 (1984) (“Geduldig has made it
more difficult to claim that reproductive freedom is an aspect of sex-based equality.”).
27. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice The Contributions of the Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights
Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 725, 748–50 (1981); Nicole Huberfeld, Conditional Spending and
Compulsory Maternity, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 751, 759 & n.39 (“[A] Constitution of negative rights does not require the government to fund the exercise of positive rights.”).
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
343, 404–05 (2010).
30. See, e.g., Motion for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the American Public Health Ass’n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization
for Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11–12,
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440).
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Congress. Significantly, as embodied in the PDA, this reasoning stands
in obvious tension with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young and the
federal courts’ embrace of pregnancy blindness.
A. Feminists Bridge the Gap Between Poverty Law and Reproductive
Liberty
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, to an unprecedented extent, the
welfare rights movement challenged the constitutional distinction between a right and a privilege.31 Grassroots activists organized groups like
the National Welfare Rights Organization (NWRO) and demanded not
only fair procedures governing welfare benefits but also asserted a right
to live connected to state support.32 Similar arguments caught on in the
legal academy. Citing the “increasing size of government as an economic
unit,” Professor William Van Alstyne called for the abolition of the rightprivilege distinction in the context of certain state-created “privileges”
involving employment, housing, income replacement, and food stamps.33
Charles Reich’s “new property” theory proposed that certain government-created statuses—such as professional licenses and public benefits—should count as forms of property protected by the Due Process
Clause—property that could be taken away only after a benefits-holder
took advantage of crucial procedural protections.34 Welfare rights proponents like Frank Michelman interrogated the distinction between positive
and negative rights, suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment might
actually guarantee some minimum standard of living for the poor.35
As feminists began to explore the limits of reproductive liberty, they
echoed the reasoning of Supreme Court cases that fueled poverty lawyers’ demands for positive rights: Shapiro v. Thompson36 and Dandridge
v. Williams.37 In Griswold v. Connecticut38 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,39 the
31. See, e.g., Brenna Binns, Fencing Out the Poor The Constitutionality of Residency Requirements in Welfare Reform, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 1255, 1259 (“As a result of the welfare rights
movement, the Court gave welfare litigation higher scrutiny and recognized welfare benefits as a
right, rather than a privilege, of the poor.”).
32. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960–1973, at 76 (1993); FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS:
POLITICS AND POVERTY IN MODERN AMERICA 143 (2007).
33. William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional
Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1442, 1461–62 (1968).
34. See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734, 783–84 (1964).
35. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9–13 (1969). For further discussion of the history of the welfare
rights movement, see, for example, DAVIS, supra note 32; KORNBLUH, supra note 32; PREMILLA
NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
(2005). On the history of welfare rights litigation in the Supreme Court, see, for example,
ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND
THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997).
36. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
37. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
38. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Supreme Court had suggested that the Constitution offered some protection for crucial decisions involving reproduction.40 By turning to poverty
law, some feminists asked whether reproductive liberty was among the
“rights . . . so fundamental that the state must provide . . . the means to
exercise them.”41
These efforts began in the litigation of Dandridge itself, a case involving a constitutional challenge to Maryland’s maximum-grant law.42
The statute capped payments under the state’s Aid to Dependent Families
with Children regardless of the size of a beneficiary’s family.43 While the
Maryland law did nothing to stop women from having children, the maximum-grant policy penalized those with larger families.44 The Dandridge
appellees argued before the Supreme Court that such a penalty violated
the Constitution:
This Court has left no doubt that, while under certain exceptional circumstances infringement, by government, of this right of procreation
and marital privacy will be upheld, it constitutes impermissible invidious discrimination to discourage one class of individuals from exercising these basic rights while zealously safeguarding the exercise of
45
those rights by others similarly situated.

When the Court decided Dandridge, the justices made no mention
of fundamental rights to procreate, indeed retreating from positions taken
in earlier poverty-law decisions.46 Dandridge rejected poverty lawyers’
challenge to the Maryland maximum grant law, but in spite of the decision, the premise of the appellees’ brief—that some form of heightened
scrutiny ought to apply to laws that burdened procreative rights—
inspired legal feminists intent on testing the boundaries of reproductive
liberty.47
Prior to 1974, these arguments figured centrally in the litigation of
discriminatory leave policies affecting public school teachers and Air
40. On the state of the privacy right in the aftermath of Eisenstadt, see DAVID J. GARROW,
LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 542–97
(1994).
41. Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae and Annexed Brief of the American
Public Health Ass’n, Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., the National Organization for
Women and Certain Medical School Deans, Professors and Individual Physicians at 11–12, Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440) [hereinafter Annexed Brief].
42. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473.
43. Id. at 473–74.
44. See id. at 473–75
45. Brief for Appellees at 32, Dandridge, 397 U.S. 471 (No. 131) (footnote omitted).
46. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264–66 (1970). Dandridge rejected challenges
to the Maryland law involving both the federal Social Security Act and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 482–83, 486–87.
47. On the history of these efforts, see Dinner, supra note 18, at 445–47, 449–57. For more on
LaFleur and reproductive liberty, see Tracy A. Thomas, The Struggle for Gender Equality in the
Northern District of Ohio, in JUSTICE AND LEGAL CHANGE ON THE SHORES OF LAKE ERIE: A
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 165, 165–
83 (Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander eds., 2012).
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Force service personnel, including Struck v. Secretary of Defense,48 a
case famously litigated by ACLU attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg.49 In her
brief in Struck, Ginsburg contended:
The discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation,
barring pregnant women and mothers from continued service in the
Air Force, reflects the discredited notion that a woman who becomes
pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at home to await
childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of
this outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally encroaches
50
upon her right to privacy in the conduct of her personal life.

Other pregnancy discrimination cases elaborated on Ginsburg’s
claim that discriminatory policies unconstitutionally burdened women’s
substantive due process rights. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,51 Jane Picker and her colleagues challenged a maternity leave
policy requiring schoolteachers to take eight months of leave without
pay.52 Picker argued that “[t]he waiting period in LaFleur thus penalize[d] Respondents’ fundamental right to bear children.”53
These arguments represented an early form of what the Article calls
meaningful-choice reasoning. Even if hirers had no constitutional duty to
assist women seeking to effectuate their procreative rights, feminists
argued that the Equal Protection Clause prevented employers from conditioning a woman’s economic security on her surrender of procreative
rights.54 Insofar as the Constitution protected reproductive liberty, employers could not force women to choose between bearing children and
attaining the economic security available to other workers. When the
courts identified such an unfair choice, heightened judicial scrutiny
should apply.
More ambitiously, legal feminists joined poverty lawyers in questioning the logic underlying the right-privilege distinction in constitutional law. In 1892, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes articulated the distinction between a protected right and a mere privilege.55 In McAuliffe v.

48. Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 460 F.2d 1372 (9th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). The
Supreme Court would ultimately dismiss Struck’s appeal as moot. Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409 U.S.
1071, 1071 (1972).
49. On the history and importance of the Struck litigation, see generally Neil S. Siegel &
Reva B. Siegel, Struck By Stereotype Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Pregnancy Discrimination as Sex
Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010).
50. Brief for the Petitioner at 52, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178) (footnotes omitted).
51. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
52. Brief for Respondents at 44, Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (No. 72777).
53. Id. at 45.
54. See, e.g., Brief for the Petitioner at 50–56, Struck, 409 U.S. 1071 (No. 72-178).
55. On Holmes’ early framing of the right-privilege distinction, see Deborah Dinner, Recovering the LaFleur Doctrine, 22 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 343, 384 (2010).
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City of New Bedford,56 Holmes rejected the claim of a policeman, who
had been fired for violating a law restricting certain political activities:
“The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has
no constitutional right to be a policeman.”57 In the late 1960s and early
1970s, the right-privilege distinction came under fire, as legal academics
and attorneys sought to carve out exceptions to it.58 Feminist litigators
hinted at the existence of a hierarchy of constitutional rights: some were
so fundamental that the State had an affirmative duty to guarantee their
effectuation.59Feminists suggested that reproductive liberty might occupy
a place at the top of that hierarchy of rights.60
In the juridical arena, meaningful-choice arguments peaked during
the litigation of Geduldig, a challenge to the constitutionality of the
pregnancy exclusion in the California Disability Fund.61 Significantly,
Geduldig came before the Supreme Court in the aftermath of Roe v.
Wade. In that case, the Court had invalidated the abortion restrictions
then on the books, suggesting that the constitutional right to privacy “is
broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”62 The Roe Court limited the abortion right in several ways: by assigning it at least equally to the woman’s physician and by
creating a trimester framework that gave the states more regulatory authority in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy.63 Just the same,
legal feminists read their victory in LaFleur as an extension—and clarification—of the right announced in Roe. In LaFleur, the Supreme Court
had struck down an eight-month mandatory leave policy because it “employ[ed] irrebuttable presumptions that unduly penalize a [woman] . . .
for deciding to bear a child.”64 While resting on procedural due process,
LaFleur fueled feminist arguments about the scope of reproductive liberty.65
Feminist attorney Wendy Webster Williams, who argued Geduldig
before the Supreme Court, read LaFleur as an expansion of the liberty
recognized in Roe.66 Citing LaFleur, Williams’s brief reasoned that
“[t]he strict scrutiny test is applicable not only where the denial of a fun56. 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892), abrogation recognized by O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
57. Id. at 517.
58. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, Enlarging the Administrative Polity Administrative Law and
the Changing Definition of Pluralism, 1945-1970, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1389, 1428–34 (2000) (describing the attacks that convinced “the Court [to] repudiate[] the rights/privileges distinction”).
59. See, e.g., Annexed Brief, supra note 41, at 11–12.
60. See, e.g., id.
61. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 486 (1974), superseded by statute as recognized in
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
62. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
63. Id. at 152–63.
64. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 648 (1974).
65. See, e.g., Dinner, supra note 55, at 404–05 (recovering the “multiple, expansive meanings” of LaFleur for legal feminists).
66. See Brief for Appellees at 52–54, Geduldig, 417 U.S. 484 (No. 73-640).
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damental right is absolute, but also where state regulation penalizes its
free exercise.”67 In Williams’s account, pregnancy discrimination counted as the kind of penalty on reproductive choice forbidden by the Constitution:
Unlike any other disabled worker in the State of California covered
by the state disability insurance program, the woman who suffers a
disability in connection with her pregnancy is left to bear the economic consequences of her inability to work. As a result of her pregnancy, a woman faces medical bills, the possible cost of temporary
help and, if her pregnancy is successfully concluded, a new child to
support at the very time she is unable to bring home wages to pay for
these expenses. . . . The denial of benefits available to other workers
therefore constitutes a substantial burden upon her exercise of her
right to bear a child and the State must demonstrate a compelling in68
terest in its classification.

An ACLU brief co-signed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg similarly concluded that Roe and LaFleur had transformed reproductive liberty:
Under due process principles, the state is required to show that a
compelling interest justifies the substantial burden placed upon exercise of the fundamental freedom to decide whether to bear a child.
Appellant has not demonstrated any such compelling interest; therefore the treatment of pregnancy-related disabilities violates the due
69
process clause.

Roe had recognized that “the decision whether to continue or to
terminate a pregnancy . . . must be left up to the individual . . . lest the
state unconstitutionally intrude into the zone of privacy protected by the
Constitution.”70 LaFleur further narrowed the State’s power to regulate
reproductive liberty insofar as it “recognized that this zone of privacy
with respect to child bearing is unconstitutionally infringed by governmental action which has the effect of burdening women who chose to
continue pregnancy rather than terminate it.”71
Geduldig represented an important opportunity for legal feminists
seeking a more robust jurisprudence of reproductive liberty. Feminists
highlighted the particularly harsh impact of pregnancy discrimination on
poor women—an argument carried forward in challenges to state bans on
the Medicaid funding of abortion.72 For example, in Klein v. Nassau

67. Id. at 53.
68. Id. at 53–54.
69. Brief Amici Curiae for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. at 7, Geduldig, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (No. 73-640).
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE
121 (2015).
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County Medical Center,73 a federal district court struck down a directive
prohibiting the use of Medicaid funding for abortion, explaining that
women choosing abortion “alone are subjected to State coercion to bear
children which they do not wish to bear.”74 Constitutionally, as Klein
recognized, Medicaid bans imposed the same kind of impermissible condition at work in Geduldig, denying a woman “medical assistance unless
she resigns her freedom of choice and bears the child.”75 Together, abortion and pregnancy disability litigation promised to entrench a much
broader understanding of reproductive liberty.
B. The Supreme Court Rejects Meaningful Choice
The Supreme Court rejected the expansive understanding of choice
advanced by feminists, adopting the position staked out by both business
organizations and some abortion opponents. In Geduldig, industry groups
and corporations had argued that, under Roe and LaFleur, pregnancy had
become a choice controlled entirely by a woman—something entirely
different from the illnesses and injuries often covered by disability policies.76 For example, in an amicus brief in Geduldig, the General Electric
Company, a company that did not cover pregnancy under its disability
policy, argued:
Thus pregnancy, unlike any sickness or accident, results from the
cumulative, four-fold exercise of free will necessary for a woman to
bear a child: (1) there must be a voluntary decision to marry, as marriage still reflects by far the current standard of morality; (2) the couple must elect to have sexual intercourse—a two-person decision; (3)
the couple must elect that conception will result—i.e., must elect to
reject the various alternative methods available for avoiding pregnancy; and (4) if conception takes place, the couple must elect to accept
the pregnancy and have the baby, and not to terminate the pregnancy
by abortion. It should also be noted that even for the unmarried, the
77
latter three choices are viable alternatives to the pregnant state.

As General Electric understood it, women already enjoyed true reproductive liberty. As a result, women could not fairly expect an employer to subsidize their procreative decisions, particularly since other
workers could not enjoy the same benefits.78

73. 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1972), vacated by 412 U.S. 925 (1973).
74. Id. at 500. For post-1973 decisions in the same vein, see Doe v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1112
(10th Cir. 1974); Planned Parenthood Ass’n v. Fitzpatrick, 401 F. Supp. 554, 579–82 (E.D. Pa.
1975); Doe v. Westby, 383 F. Supp. 1143 (D.S.D. 1974), vacated sub nom. Westby v. Doe, 420 U.S.
968 (1975).
75. Klein, 347 F. Supp. at 500.
76. See, e.g., Brief for General Electric Co. as Amicus Curiae at 21–22, Geduldig, 417 U.S.
484 (1974) (No. 73-640).
77. Id.
78. See id. at 6–8.
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Later in the 1970s, antiabortion attorneys borrowed from this vision
of choice in defending Medicaid funding bans. Defending such a funding
restriction in Connecticut, pro-life attorneys stressed that nothing in the
law “prevent[ed] a woman from making a choice to have an abortion.”79
The State’s responsibility ended with its duty not to prohibit abortion.
Beyond that, women themselves bore the costs of indigence and lack of
access to medical services. “[U]nder Roe,” pro-life attorneys explained in
Maher, “an indigent woman was not given an additional fundamental
right to have an abortion paid for from public funds.”80
In both Geduldig and Maher, the Supreme Court thoroughly rejected the meaningful-choice reasoning on which feminists had relied. Decided in 1974, Geduldig found that California’s disability policy did not
discriminate on the basis of sex since there was “no risk from which men
[were] protected and women [were] not.”81 Neither the majority nor the
dissent mentioned the reproductive-liberty claims emphasized by feminists.82
While Geduldig failed to mention reproductive liberty, Maher, a
case involving the constitutionality of bans on the public funding of
abortion, suggested that abortion rights guaranteed only a right to be left
alone.83 By conditioning the receipt of support on a woman’s surrender
of her abortion right, Connecticut placed “no obstacles absolute or otherwise in the pregnant woman’s path to an abortion.”84 As Maher explained, “An indigent woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund childbirth;
she continues as before to be dependent on private sources for the service
she desires.”85
Taken together, Maher and Geduldig limited the promise of reproductive-liberty doctrine in the courts. In 1980, the Court confirmed its
rejection of the doctrine in Harris v. McRae,86 upholding the Hyde
Amendment, a federal ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion.87
However, failure in the courts did not mark the end of efforts to advance meaningful-choice arguments. Indeed, after 1976, in General

79. Brief of the Appellant at 14, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (No. 75-1440).
80. Id.
81. Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496–97.
82. On Geduldig’s obscuring of the importance of equal sexual liberty, see Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 EMORY L.J. 1235, 1236–38
(2007). The Geduldig dissent failed to make any mention of women’s reproductive liberty. See
Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 498–505 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Maher, 432 U.S. at 473–74.
84. Id. at 474.
85. Id.
86. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
87. Id. at 326–27.
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Electric Company v. Gilbert,88 when the Court rejected arguments that
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited pregnancy discrimination,89 those on opposing sides of the abortion issue revived the constitutional arguments for meaningful reproductive choice rejected by the
Court, this time acting in the legislative arena.
Significantly, in the later 1970s, antiabortion activists as well as
feminists made some version of meaningful choice a centerpiece of their
legal agenda. In the aftermath of the Roe decision, antiabortion leaders
turned to a variety of constitutional strategies to outlaw most or all abortions, including an Article V amendment campaign.90 In formulating
these responses to Roe, pro-lifers defined a new class deserving protection under the Fourteenth Amendment: vulnerable and dependent persons.91 For the members of groups like American Citizens Concerned for
Life (ACCL) and Feminists for Life, pregnant women fit this category
perfectly.92 These pro-life activists recognized that some women turned
to abortion because they faced sex discrimination at work.93 Poor women
often faced an impossible choice between exercising procreative liberty
and guaranteeing themselves economic security.94 Recognizing this dilemma, some pro-lifers presented protection from pregnancy discrimination as a precondition for meaningful reproductive choice.95 Conversely,
when the government refused to ensure women protection from sex discrimination, as pro-lifers argued, the government put unconstitutional
burdens on women’s reproductive choice. Thoroughly rejected by the
courts, this understanding of choice reappeared as a robust legislative
constitutional norm—one on which activists deeply divided by the abortion issue agreed.
C. Pro-Lifers Work to Redefine Equal Protection of the Law
From the outset, the pro-life movement defined its cause as a constitutional one, based on a fundamental right they identified in the Fourteenth Amendment.96 At the state and local level, pro-life organizations
88. 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute as recognized in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
89. See id. at 136–40.
90. For an overview of pro-life constitutional strategy in the period, see Mary Ziegler, Ways
to Change A Reevaluation of Article V Campaigns and Legislative Constitutionalism, 2009 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 969, 973–84; see also ZIAD W. MUNSON, THE MAKING OF PRO-LIFE ACTIVISTS: HOW
SOCIAL MOVEMENT MOBILIZATION WORKS 85–87 (2008); Keith Cassidy, The Right to Life Movement Sources, Development, and Strategies, in THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 128, 143–50 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 1995).
91. See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 28–29, 34, 45.
92. For a study of these groups and their influence on pro-life constitutionalism, see Mary
Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life Feminism, 28
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 237–46 (2013).
93. See Mary Ziegler, Beyond Backlash Legal History, Polarization, and Roe v. Wade, 71
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 969, 993–98 (2014).
94. See id.
95. See id.
96. See Mary Ziegler, Originalism Talk A Legal History, 2014 B.Y.U. L. REV. 869, 884–86.
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mobilized in the late 1960s to preserve existing bans on abortion.97
Groups like the Southern California Right to Life League, New York
State Right to Life, and the Illinois Right to Life Committee chose names
that referred to the “right to life” mentioned in the Declaration of Independence.98 The same constitutional commitment defined the pre-1973
agendas of national organizations like the National Right to Life Committee (NRLC) and Americans United for Life (AUL). “Protecting the
right to life of the unborn child,” the NRLC Statement of Purpose asserted, “is a central issue to the National Right to Life Committee.”99 Similarly, the AUL’s Declaration of Purpose similarly explained: “Believing
with those who hold that all men are created equal, we proclaim that
among our precious civil and natural liberties and rights is the responsibility of society to safeguard the integral life of every human being from
conception to natural death.”100
Over the course of the late 1960s and early 1970s, antiabortion activists began to ground their normative commitments in existing constitutional doctrine. Significantly, abortion opponents identified their cause
with both substantive due process and equal protection doctrine.101
Working in emerging national groups like the NRLC and the AUL, prolifers forged an argument based on the overlap of liberty and equality
norms, training their fire on laws that denied vulnerable groups the implicit right to life.102
Activists like Robert Byrn, a grassroots organizer and Fordham law
professor, presented dependency as a classic suspect classification, and
Byrn argued that abortion represented precisely the kind of invidious
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was designed to root
out.103 In particular, Byrn compared fetuses to illegitimate children, a
group afforded some protection by the Supreme Court in the late
1960s.104 For example, in 1968, in Levy v. Louisiana,105 the Court had
97. On the mobilization of pro-life activists, see supra note 90 and accompanying text.
98. On the naming of the Right to Life League of Southern California and New York State
Right to Life, see Fred C. Shapiro, Right to Life’ Has a Message for New York State Legislators,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1972, at SM10, SM34. On the early activity of the Right to Life League of
Southern California, see Keith Monroe, How California’s Abortion Law Isn’t Working, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 29, 1968, at SM10–12. On the founding of the Illinois Right to Life Committee, see SUZANNE
STAGGENBORG, THE PRO-CHOICE MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ABORTION
CONFLICT 35 (1991).
99. National Right to Life Committee Statement of Purpose (on file with The American
Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
100. Americans United for Life, Declaration of Purpose (1974) (on file with Concordia Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri in The Executive File).
101. ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 29, 85.
102. See id. at 28–35, 85.
103. See, e.g., Robert M. Byrn, Demythologizing Abortion Reform, 14 CATH. LAW. 180, 183
(1968). For further examples of pro-lifers’ reliance on the Equal Protection Clause, see David W.
Louisell, Abortion, The Practice of Medicine and the Due Process of Law, 16 UCLA L. REV. 233,
234 (1968–69).
104. Byrn, supra note 103, at 183.
105. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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first struck down an illegitimacy classification, explaining, “We start
from the premise that illegitimate children are not ‘nonpersons.’ They are
humans, live, and have their being. They are clearly ‘persons’ within the
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”106
Byrn saw abortion as the type of discrimination that Levy condemned. Levy suggested that any child qualified as a legal person if she
was human and alive107 —criteria which, in Byrn’s view, clearly applied
to the unborn child.108 The traits that differentiated the unborn child from
other Americans—age, vulnerability, and dependency—made no constitutional difference.109 Indeed, the dependent required additional constitutional and other legal protections. Highlighting President Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, Byrn insisted: “The more dependent and helpless
a person is, the more solicitous the law is of his welfare.”110
Like Byrn, other pro-lifers deployed a theory of equal liberty, insisting that the Constitution recognized an implicit right to life that had to be
equally available to the unborn child. For example, Martin McKernan of
the NRLC emphasized: “All in all, the law has consistently established
certain procedural safeguards around fundamental rights to which the
unborn was entitled. That most fundamental of rights - not to be deprived
of life without due process of the law - cannot be ignored.”111
Activists like Byrn and McKernan did not address the ways in
which unborn children did not resemble a suspect class: there was no
obvious history of discrimination against fetuses, and neither age nor
dependency was immutable—as Byrn acknowledged, both represented
phases experienced by every citizen who reached adulthood.112 Moreover, like some gender distinctions, physical disability and dependency
could constitute real biological differences.113 From the standpoint of
conventional equal protection law, a fetus may not be similarly situated
to a child, and a person in a persistent vegetative state may not be comparable to a legally competent adult.
While claiming that protections for unborn children fit within a
conventional equal-protection framework, pro-lifers like Byrn actually
106. Id. at 70 (footnote omitted).
107. See id.
108. See Byrn, supra note 103, at 183.
109. Robert M. Byrn, Abortion in Perspective, 5 DUQ. U. L. REV. 125, 127–34 (1966–67).
110. Id. at 133.
111. Legal Report from Martin F. McKernan, Jr., Nat’l Right to Life Comm. 4 (Jul. 1970) (on
file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald
Ford Memorial Library).
112. See Byrn, supra note 109, at 128.
113. Indeed, in determining whether disability discrimination warranted heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court emphasized that disabled persons had real impairments
that justified different legislative treatment. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S.
432, 442–45 (1985).
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demanded a bold reconceptualization of the doctrine. Conventional
equal-protection doctrine focused on whether vulnerable individuals had
an immutable trait, like race or gender.114 Activists like Byrn implicitly
conceded that the unborn children had no such trait. Indeed, pro-lifers
presented abortion as discriminatory precisely because it deprived unborn children of life, notwithstanding the fact that they resembled other
rights-holders in every constitutionally salient way.115 Strategically, this
move allowed antiabortion activists to respond to claims that fetuses did
not count as legal persons under the Fourteenth Amendment.116 At the
same time, by stressing the similarities between fetuses and other persons, antiabortion activists like Byrn expressed deeply held beliefs that
abortion would lead the nation down a slippery slope to euthanasia and
discrimination against the disabled.117
In 1973, the Roe Court rejected many of the premises of pro-life
constitutionalism—including the personhood of the fetus and the conclusion that life began at conception—while pushing others entirely below
the surface.118 The district court in Roe had applied conventional strict
scrutiny in analyzing an abortion regulation, asking whether such a ban
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling justification.119 This framing
set the terms of the Supreme Court’s own discussion. In resolving
whether the State’s interest in protecting life was compelling, the Court
highlighted disagreements between medical, philosophical, and religious
authorities, concluding that “the unborn have never been recognized in
the law as persons in the whole sense.”120 The Court touched only indirectly on the question of a right to life, assuming that “[i]f . . . [fetal] personhood is established,” the case for abortion rights would collapse, “for
the fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the [Four-

114. See Kenji Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection The Visibility Presumption
and the Case of “Don't Ask, Don't Tell,” 108 YALE L.J. 485, 496 (1998) (describing the Court’s
former requirement that, in order to be considered a suspect class, a group must have “obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristic[s]” (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602
(1987))).
115. See, e.g., Louisell, supra note 103, at 247 (“Medical evidence would indicate that the
various stages of development [were] merely labels which have been placed upon what is in fact the
steady, constant growth of the human being.”).
116. See, e.g., Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Certain Physicians, Professors and Fellows
of the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology in Support of Appellees at 26, Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Nos. 70-18, 70-40) (“When one views the present state of medical science, we
find that the artificial distinction between born and unborn has vanished.”); Motion for Leave to
Submit a Brief Amici Curiae Brief of Women for the Unborn et al. in Support of Appellees at 9, Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-18) (“Modern genetics has confirmed scientifically what
women have long felt intuitively—the presence of another human life, a life to be reverenced and
protected.”).
117. See, e.g., Press Release, Nellie J. Gray, Chairman, Nat’l March for Life Comm. (Jan. 22,
1974) [hereinafter NMLC Press Release] (on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life
Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
118. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153–64.
119. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217, 1222–23 (N.D. Tex. 1970), rev’d, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
120. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157–63.
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teenth] Amendment.”121 By dismissing the idea that the framers of the
Fourteenth Amendment defined fetuses as persons, the Court went no
further in exploring whether the Constitution recognized a right to life.122
Movement leaders responded by working harder than ever to revolutionize equal-protection jurisprudence, pushing powerlessness and
helplessness as the center of constitutional analysis. Nellie Gray’s March
for Life, an organization leading a major pro-life protest of the same
name, issued materials explaining: “If our Constitution, as now interpreted, cannot guarantee the right to be secure in one’s person in order to be
born, it cannot long protect the right to be secure in one’s person during
illness, physical and mental disability, [and] senility . . . .”123
Partly for this reason, the fetal-protective amendment preferred by
many pro-lifers advanced a right to equal treatment not only for the unborn but also for any similarly vulnerable individuals.124 A variety of
Article V amendments proposed in Congress would have changed the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, explicitly including the unborn
as persons.125 However, leaders of groups like the NRLC and AUL insisted that their movement demanded protection for all vulnerable and
dependent persons. The NRLC endorsed an amendment that would require protection of life regardless of age, health, function or condition of
dependency.126 Dr. John Willke of the NRLC insisted that “civil rights
[under the Fourteenth Amendment] mean nothing if they do not protect
the weakest and most helpless of the humans among us.”127 He asked:
“[S]hould we allow the Supreme Court to define the right to life on the
basis of age and place of residence?”128
D. Pro-Life Activists Contest the Meaning of Dependency and Vulnerability
While antiabortion activists shared a vision of the Equal Protection
Clause, movement members disagreed intensely about who counted as
vulnerable and dependent persons. Some movement members focused
exclusively on the abortion issue, while others also mobilized to battle
living-will and death-with-dignity laws.129 Still others viewed pregnant
women, and perhaps all women, as vulnerable, dependent, and deserving
121. Id. at 156–57.
122. See id.
123. NMLC Press Release, supra note 117.
124. ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 29.
125. See, e.g., id. at 43–45.
126. See NMLC Press Release, supra note 117.
127. Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion Hearings on Proposed Constitutional
Amendments on Abortion Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 399 (1976) (Statement of Dr. John Willke).
128. Id. at 405.
129. On the diversity of motives and tactics characterizing pro-life activism in the period, see,
for example, MUNSON, supra note 90, at 192; and see also CAROL J. C. MAXWELL, PRO-LIFE
ACTIVISTS IN AMERICA: MEANING, MOTIVATION, AND DIRECT ACTION 2, 8, 21 (2002).
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of protection. These activists expressed themselves in the conventional
rhetoric of the pro-life movement, demanding a reworking of equalprotection doctrine. However, as this Part shows, these advocates moved
toward a radical reconceptualization of the movement’s goals, one centered partly on women’s constitutional interests in liberty and equality.
These activists turned to meaningful choice in advocating what they
viewed as both protections against sex discrimination and alternatives to
abortion. To be sure, antiabortion advocates disagreed with feminists
about the meaning of reproductive liberty.130 They insisted that the State
should ban all, or most, abortions—and could do so without denying
women constitutional autonomy.131 At the same time, some influential
pro-life activists maintained that women did not have the freedom to
choose childbirth or procreation unless the State protected them against
sex discrimination.132
During the battle for an Article V amendment recognizing a right to
life, members of ACCL , an influential antiabortion organization, began
to develop an argument that combined antidiscrimination and reproductive-liberty reasoning. In testifying in favor of an Article V amendment
banning abortion, Dorothy Czarnecki of the ACCL argued:
It is my opinion that women are equal to but not the same as men. In
the natural order of things, this will never change. Women deserve
equal rights, equal pay, equal job opportunities, and equal[ity] under
the law. Women ought to have the right over their own bodies, insofar as they can determine whether or not they shall become pregnant.
They deserve to be educated. Equal opportunity means that, rich or
poor, black or white, they shall [be able] . . . to receive sex education,
and contraceptive information . . . . It does not mean that we shall
133
supply abortion to those who cannot afford it.

Czarnecki endorsed an idea of choice that seemed incoherent to
feminists who saw the connection between abortion rights, autonomy,
and equality for women. At the same time, Czarnecki agreed with feminists that formal equality was not enough to guarantee women meaningful reproductive choice. “Equal opportunity” involved neither abortion
nor identical treatment: women’s special vulnerability meant that they
needed and deserved assistance in accessing sex education and contraception.134 Czarnecki’s vision of equality for women would drive pro-life
support for the PDA. Members of groups like the ACCL concluded that
pregnancy made women biologically and culturally different, vulnerable
130. See Ziegler, supra note 93, at 982.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Abortion—Part 2 Hearing on S.J. Res. 119 and S.J. Res. 130 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Amendments of the S. Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong. 312 (April 1974) (Statement of
Dorothy Czarnecki).
134. See id.
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to pernicious forms of discrimination.135 Equal treatment for pregnant
women would require some affirmative intervention on the part of the
State—to end discrimination and to ensure pregnant women a minimum
level of income, healthcare, and child care.
In 1975, while still pushing an Article V amendment, Marjory
Mecklenburg of the ACCL modified the reproductive-liberty reasoning
used in the litigation of Geduldig.136 First, Mecklenburg testified that
pregnant women represented a key example of the vulnerable persons
currently denied the protection of the Constitution. Asking Congress to
pay more attention to the women who wanted to continue a pregnancy,
Mecklenburg asserted that such women constituted “a disadvantaged
class.”137 Pregnant women were vulnerable partly because the government denied them meaningful reproductive choice. “It is sad indeed,” she
testified, “that women are making choices about whether to give their
children the right to life or to terminate based on economic conditions. If
they feel pressured because of the economic situation, we can ask what
kind of a choice do they really have?”138
By 1975, activists like Mecklenburg had elaborated on this idea of
choice, translating it into a powerful vision for legislative change. Mecklenburg lobbied for a number of laws designed to help pregnant women
and new mothers: amendments to the Social Security Act allowing pregnant women to claim unborn children as dependents; “federal and individual state legislation . . . providing that pregnancy, parenthood, or marital status cannot constitute grounds for denial of education”; and social
welfare programs designed to help indigent, adolescent mothers.139 In
February 1975, Mecklenburg came out in favor of the School Age Mothers and Children Act of 1975, an ultimately unsuccessful social welfare
bill sponsored by abortion-rights champions Birch Bayh (D-IN) and Ted
Kennedy (D-MA).140 The law would have guaranteed a variety of family
planning, childcare, and healthcare services for adolescent mothers and
their children.141 Guaranteeing adolescent mothers meaningful reproductive choice would, in Mecklenburg’s view, reduce abortion rates, since
the mother of a fetus was the “first line of defense against pre-birth ag135. See, e.g., ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 195–200.
136. See Abortion—Part IV Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, S.J. Res. 10, S.J. Res. 11, and S.J. Res. 91
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Judiciary Comm., 94th Cong. 644–46,
648, 650, 653, 694 (June 1975) (Statement of Marjory Mecklenburg).
137. Id. at 654.
138. Id. at 648–49.
139. See id. at 646, 655–56. This part later discusses several of these lobbying efforts at greater
length.
140. See School-Age Mother and Child Health Act, 1975 Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Pub. Welfare, 94th Cong. 495–96 (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter
School-Age Mother and Child Act] (Statement of Marjory Mecklenburg) (on file with author);
MARIS A. VINOVSKIS, AN “EPIDEMIC” OF ADOLESCENT PREGNANCY?: SOME HISTORICAL AND
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 50 (1988).
141. See VINOVSKIS, supra note 140, at 51.
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gression.”142 But Mecklenburg went further, endorsing her own understanding of constitutional choice:
[M]any poor women, pressed by financial circumstances, presently
have only the “freedom” to abort . . . .
....
Alternatives to abortion must be real if freedom of conscience and responsibility are to be more than rhetoric. This means that society
must offer good health care, both pre and post-natal; daycare facili143
ties; . . . [and] maternity and paternity leave . . . .

The vision of meaningful choice written into laws like the School
Age Mother and Child Act assumed that the State had to refrain from
burdening women’s decisions. Mecklenburg explained: “Americans must
examine the pregnant woman’s life situation, assess what is necessary to
preserve her personal dignity and her mental and physical health, and
then provide for these needs. . . . Women must not be forced by circumstances to seek an abortion . . . .”144
Prior to 1976, members of the ACCL borrowed heavily from the
special-burden reasoning rejected by the courts, giving it new life as a
legislative constitutional norm. For legal feminists, special-burden reasoning served a different purpose: rebutting claims that women demanded preferential treatment. As the battle against pregnancy discrimination
moved to Congress, business leaders and industry groups insisted that
pregnancy disability policies themselves represented discrimination
against men.145 Given the right of reproductive choice, women bore children and then unfairly demanded that someone else foot the bill. For
legal feminists responding to these charges, it became crucial to show
that women wanted equal, rather than special, opportunities. Reworking
the reproductive-liberty reasoning used by some pro-lifers offered feminists a valuable strategy for achieving this task.
E. Feminists Shift from Juridical to Legislative Constitutionalism
In the aftermath of their defeat in Geduldig, feminists turned to Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a source of protection against
pregnancy discrimination, this time, working with an unlikely set of allies. As the New York Times reported in September 1975, “A cause that
has managed to unite women from feminists to members of the Right to
Life movement is the right to disability benefits for time lost due to
142. School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 511.
143. Id. at 499, 501 (quoting National Council of Churches Study Paper (Mar. 2, 1972)).
144. Id. at 511.
145. See, e.g., Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, 1977 Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Human Resources, 95 Cong 1st Sess. (1977) 481–88 [hereinafter Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy] (statement of Brockwell Heylin).
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pregnancy.”146 Progress in the courts made Title VII litigation an attractive option: the Second and Third Circuit held that pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII notwithstanding the holding of Geduldig.147 Relying on LaFleur, the Supreme Court itself had struck down a Utah law
disqualifying women from receiving unemployment insurance for an
eighteen-week period preceding and following pregnancy because they
were “unable to work.”148 As Kathy Willert Peratis of the ACLU explained: “We’re really making headway now.”149
This progress came to an abrupt halt in 1976 when the Supreme
Court decided General Electric Co. v. Gilbert. Rejecting the interpretation of Title VII adopted by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and many lower courts, the Gilbert Court decided that pregnancy
discrimination did not count as sex discrimination.150 Gilbert reasoned
that what women demanded was not protection against discrimination
but rather special treatment, since “pregnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate
them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits,
accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks.”151
For legal feminists, Gilbert’s reasoning was deeply disappointing.
Peratis put the point bluntly, telling the New York Times: “We bombed
out in court, so we’ll have to go to Congress.”152 However, feminists did
far more then switch from the juridical to the legislative arena. Instead,
organizations like the ACLU and the Women’s Legal Defense Fund
(WLDF) continued litigating, seeking to carve out a space for Title VII
protections in the aftermath of Gilbert. In cases like Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty,153 feminists had to work within a Gilbert framework that denied
women’s right to “special treatment” in the context of pregnancy.154 In
turn, Satty and Gilbert helped to shape the arguments used by both business lobbyists and legal feminists in the battle for the PDA. Business
leaders popularized the idea of pregnancy disability as reverse discrimination against men.155 Since women had the freedom to terminate preg146. Virginia Lee Warren, The Fight for Disability Benefits in Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
16, 1975, at 36.
147. On the perceived promise of Title VII litigation in the period, see, for example, id.
148. Turner v. Dep’t of Emp. Sec. of Utah, 423 U.S. 44, 45 (1975).
149. Warren, supra note 146.
150. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145–46 (1976).
151. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
152. Keith Love, Pregnancy Sick Benefits Call for Action on Court Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, at 46
(Dec.
10,
1976),
http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/122937067?accountid=14608 (quoting Statement
by Kathleen Peratis of the ACLU).
153. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
154. On the constraints faced by feminists after Geduldig, see, for example, Deborah Dinner,
Strange Bedfellows at Work Neomaternalism in the Making of Sex Discrimination Law, 91 WASH.
U. L. REV. 453, 490–500 (2014).
155. Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, supra note 145.
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nancies, as business leaders asserted, women should have to bear the
costs of any children they bore.156 Forcing employers to do so would
result in discrimination against both male employees and business owners. Legal feminists responded by drawing on an idea of impermissible
burdens similar to the one set forth in Satty.157 The reliance on the benefit-burden distinction ultimately encouraged feminists working in Congress to turn back to the reproductive-liberty reasoning rejected by the
Court.
F. Satty Plays Up the Benefit-Burden Distinction
Nora Satty worked as a clerk in the accounting department of the
Nashville Gas Company when she became pregnant.158 The company
required Satty to take maternity leave and refused to give her sick pay
during her absence.159 Worse, while she was on leave, the company took
away the seniority Satty had already earned.160 When she reapplied for
work, the company placed her in a temporary position and, pursuant to
its policy, denied her every permanent position she applied for because
other, more senior employees had bid for them.161 After Satty completed
her temporary assignment, the company terminated her “due to lack of
work and job openings.”162
When Satty’s case came before the Supreme Court, both her counsel and amici curiae, including the ACLU and the Women’s Legal Defense Fund, focused on how Satty’s case differed from Gilbert. While
that case denied “special benefits,” Nora Satty’s defenders insisted that
they wanted nothing more than equal treatment.163 In a brief signed by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Susan Deller Ross, the ACLU and WLDF argued that “no ‘extra compensation’ issue [was] present” in Satty.164 Instead of directly challenging the validity of Gilbert or Geduldig, the brief
shifted the focus to the special burdens imposed on the liberty of Satty
and other pregnant women. As the brief explained:
Although Title VII does not require that greater economic benefits be
paid to one sex or the other “because of their different roles in the
scheme of existence”, [sic] by the same token Title VII hardly permits an employer specifically to burden female employees through165
out their working lives because of their different role.

156. See, e.g., id. at 95–97 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).
157. See, e.g., id. at 451–52 (statement of Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, Editor for Ms. magazine).
158. Satty, 434 U.S. at 139.
159. Id. at 138–39.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 139.
162. Id. at 139.
163. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of American Civil Liberties Union and Women’s Legal
Defense Fund at 6–8, Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (No. 75-536).
164. Id. at 7.
165. Id.
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The brief insisted that Satty and other pregnant women did not request accommodation of their pregnancies.166 Rather, Satty asked the
Court to stop the employer from burdening their ability to work because
they had chosen to have children.167
In a terse opinion written by Justice William Rehnquist, Satty held
that some, but not all, pregnancy discrimination violated Title VII.168
Holding that the Nashville Gas Company’s policies violated Title VII,
Rehnquist distinguished pregnancy disability policies, which afforded
pregnant women “a benefit that men cannot and do not receive,” from
the burdens imposed in Satty.169 “We held in Gilbert that [Title VII] did
not require that greater economic benefits be paid to one sex or the other
‘because of their differing roles in “the scheme of human existence,”’”
Rehnquist explained.170 “But that holding does not allow us to read [the
statute] to permit an employer to burden female employees in such a way
as to deprive them of employment opportunities because of their different role.”171
Publicly, legal feminists interpreted Satty as a signal that legislative,
rather than juridical, constitutionalism represented the most promising
path for women seeking equal treatment or reproductive liberty.172 Since
Satty did not provide clear guidance about when pregnancy disability
policies would run afoul of Title VII, Susan Deller Ross of the ACLU
called the decision “confused,” reasoning that it “showed the importance
of a new Federal law to make all discrimination against pregnant workers
illegal.”173
Rather than simply reinforcing the importance of amending Title
VII, Satty encouraged feminists to change the temporary-disability paradigm used for much of the early 1970s.174 Defining pregnancy as a mere
temporary disability had worked to dispel the myth that women who bore
children necessarily left work to raise them.175 At the same time,
“[c]lassifying pregnancy within the temporary disability framework
. . . represented an effort to extend socioeconomic protection to
childbearing workers without discouraging women’s employment.”176
After Gilbert, skeptical members of Congress and business leaders denounced any effort to provide socioeconomic protection for women, pre166. Id. at 15–17.
167. See id. at 7–9.
168. See Satty, 434 U.S. at 143–46.
169. Id. at 142.
170. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 (1976)).
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Warren Weaver Jr., Justices, 9-0, Block a Loss of Seniority in Maternity Leave,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1977, at A1, A18.
173. Id. at A18 (quoting Statement by Susan Deller Ross, Clinical Director, ACLU).
174. For a study of the temporary disability paradigm, see Dinner, supra note 18, at 449–56.
175. See id. at 454–55.
176. Id. at 455.
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senting it as the kind of unfair special accommodation that Gilbert rejected.177 During and after Satty, legal feminists responded by reframing
the PDA not only as “an effort to extend socioeconomic protection”178
but also as a guarantee that employers could not impose unique burdens
on either women’s decision to work or procreate.
G. Business Groups, Pro-Lifers, and Feminists Contest the BenefitBurden Distinction
The benefit-burden distinction central to Satty also shaped debate
about the PDA in 1977. Testifying on behalf of the Chamber of Commerce, Brockwell Heylin insisted that the issue was whether Congress
was willing to provide special benefits to pregnant women that other
workers could never enjoy.179 Testimony highlighted statistics suggesting
that only 40%–50% of pregnant workers returned to work after maternity
leave,180 while “almost 100% of other workers taking disability leave do
return to work.”181 Insofar as pregnancy was sui generis, the PDA would
not provide protection against discrimination; it would in fact discriminate against other employees. Heylin reasoned: “The pregnancy disability benefits would become a severance pay which other (non-pregnant)
employees cannot receive.”182
Testimony on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers
(NAM) made more explicit the connection between framing pregnancy
as a choice and denouncing the PDA as a form of special treatment.183
NAM representatives emphasized that men and women chose when they
married, chose when they had sexual intercourse, chose when they used
contraception, and chose when they turned to abortion.184 “Within this
climate, it is appropriate to ask how much of the economic responsibility
for parenthood will be assumed by those men and women who choose to
have children” the NAM asked, “and how much responsibility will be
[placed on] society . . . .”185 The central issue was not whether Congress
should countenance discrimination but rather “how far society chooses to
go in subsidizing parenthood.”186
As both pro-lifers and legal feminists recognized, the PDA would
create some socioeconomic security for pregnant women. Importing special-burden reasoning into the PDA allowed both groups to avoid the
charge that they demanded special treatment for women. Instead, sup177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

See, e.g., id. at 431–32.
Id. at 455.
Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, supra note 145.
Id. at 101 (Statement on National Association of Manufacturers).
Id. at 482, 488 (statement of Brockwell Heylin).
Id. at 482.
See id. at 95–97 (statement of the National Association of Manufacturers).
See id. at 96.
Id.
Id.
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porters of the PDA contended that the law protected women from unfair
and potentially unconstitutional burdens on their reproductive decisionmaking that men never faced.
Moreover, meaningful-choice reasoning allowed pro-life activists to
present their movement as reasonable, moderate, and willing to advance
real reproductive choice—a major goal of ACCL leaders.187 Lobbying
for meaningful choice showed that some pro-lifers could work in broad
legislative coalitions, advancing interests (beyond abortion bans) that
other Americans held dear.188
More broadly, pro-lifers seized on pregnancy discrimination as an
issue, hoping to “promote[] motherhood.”189 Some movement members
believed that poor women terminated their pregnancies in order to preserve their livelihood.190 Protecting women against pregnancy discrimination would ensure that more women could afford to bring their pregnancies to term. Pro-life activist and obstetrician-gynecologist Andre
Hellegers told Congress that the PDA would deter coercive abortions.191
“Let’s call it a pro-choice bill,” Hellegers quipped, “in which . . . the
choice, if it goes in any direction, is going to go in the childbirth way.”192
Other pro-life witnesses developed a more comprehensive vision of
meaningful-choice reasoning. Jacqueline Nolan-Haley of the ACCL attacked Gilbert as a “dangerous precedent with respect to the exercise of
fundamental rights.”193 Nolan-Haley identified four rights at stake in
pregnancy discrimination: “The decision to procreate, the decision not to
terminate a pregnancy, the decision to prevent [pregnancy] through contraception, and the decision to terminate a pregnancy.”194 According to
Nolan-Haley, Gilbert unjustly—and perhaps unconstitutionally—
“penalized women who chose to exercise the first two rights to the exclusion of the latter.”195

187. The ACCL, for example, stressed the need to create “a reasonable, rational, national prolife organization” in order to attract the support of those “unable to identify themselves with the
[current] highly polarized organizations.” Memorandum from ACCL on Purposes and Objectives of
ACCL (on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan
Gerald Ford Memorial Library).
188. See, e.g., Brochure, Am. Citizens Concerned for Life, No Other Vehicle Quite Like Ours
(on file with The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers in the University of Michigan Gerald
Ford Memorial Library).
189. Thea Rossi Barron, Insurance Bill Includes Pregnancy Clause, NAT. RIGHT TO LIFE
NEWS, Feb. 1978, at 8.
190. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 193–201.
191. See Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy, supra note 145, at 67–68 (statement of
Andre E. Hellegers, Professor, Georgetown University).
192. Id. at 68.
193. Id. at 437 (statement of Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Special Counsel, Am. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc.).
194. Id. at 432–33.
195. Id. at 438.
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Legal feminists like Wendy Williams and Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, a
feminist author, relied on meaningful-choice reasoning for a quite different reason: countering claims that the PDA required expensive and unfair
special treatment. In testifying in favor of the PDA, Williams spotlighted
what she called “[a] necessary side effect” of pregnancy discrimination:
“the burden placed upon a woman’s choice to bear a child.”196 She reasoned that Congress did not (and should not) intend that any citizen “forgo a fundamental right, such as a woman’s right to bear children, as a
condition precedent to the enjoyment of . . . employment free from discrimination.”197
Cottin-Pogrebin articulated the connection between pregnancy discrimination and reproductive choice more forcefully, explaining that
women asked for nothing more than protection against burdens society
never imposed on men:
Pregnancy discrimination forces us to choose between brain and
uterus; between making money and making babies; between being
productive or being reproductive. It is a false dilemma. Men do not
have to make this choice; they can be both parents and workers with198
out suffering a social, personal, or economic penalty.

In spite of deep differences about the nature of motherhood and the
need for legal abortion, the PDA campaign led pro-lifers and legal feminists to adopt a strikingly similar and transformative understanding of
reproductive choice. As Deborah Dinner has shown, legal feminists began highlighting the uniqueness of motherhood in justifying protection
from the government.199 Pro-lifers like Mecklenburg had long emphasized the uniqueness of motherhood in asserting that abortion severed a
particularly valuable bond between mother and child, thereby traumatizing any woman who terminated a pregnancy.200
Conversely, pro-life activists like Mecklenburg and Czarnecki gravitated toward a definition of meaningful reproductive choice that would
prevent discrimination against women who took leave after an abortion
as well as a pregnancy. The ACCL’s change in position was striking.
After all, leaders of the group had endorsed an Article V amendment
banning abortion, asserting that the Constitution did not recognize rights
for women “to choose to destroy their unborn children.”201 In the PDA
campaign, ACCL leaders argued that they would support the PDA regardless of whether employers had to cover post-abortion leave, because
196. Id. at 115 (statement of Wendy W. Williams, Assistant Professor of Law, Georgetown
University).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 451–52 (statement of Letty Cottin-Pogrebin, Editor for Ms. magazine).
199. See Dinner, supra note 154, at 499–500.
200. Mecklenburg, for example, called for post-abortion counseling to address women’s regret
and to prevent “recidivism.” School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 504–06.
201. Id. at 498.
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the law “would encourage a woman to keep a pregnancy or do what she
wants. It gives women a choice.”202 If anything, the ACCL favored a
version of the PDA that did not exclude post-abortion treatment, since
some within the organization believed that the law would garner more
support if no abortion exclusion applied.203 As an ACCL leader explained: “ACCL supports H.R. 6075 [the PDA] as a pro-life bill with or
without an abortion amendment and urges its prompt passage.”204
This understanding of meaningful reproductive choice made an impact on the larger society. A variety of religious organizations, including
the progressive National Council of Churches, endorsed a more robust
concept of a right to choose—one that required affirmative support for
women seeking to procreate or avoid procreation.205
More importantly, this understanding of meaningful choice influenced many of the key supporters of the PDA. Key sponsors of the PDA
across the ideological spectrum echoed this idea of reproductive choice.
Senator Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) argued that sex discrimination could
effectively coerce women into terminating a pregnancy:
[T]here are a number of reasons why a woman would want to have
an abortion. One of the reasons is that she cannot afford the expenses
attendant to a prolonged pregnancy and childbirth. . . . We are removing that [situation] where the price tag of a baby determines whether
206
it is born or not.

Representative Ronald Sarasin (R-CT) similarly argued that women
with real reproductive choice would be better able to participate in the
economic and social life of the nation.207 The PDA gave a woman “the
right to choose both, to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after her pregnancy.”208 According to a Democratic supporter of
the bill, the PDA would “put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system
that forces women to choose between family and career.”209
Those on opposing sides of the abortion issue understood meaningful reproductive choice in varying ways and described it differently over
time. In the early-to-mid-1970s, feminist litigators first used the idea to
202. Legislation to Prohibit Sex Discrimination on the Basis of Pregnancy Part 2 Hearing on
H.R. 5055 and H.R. 6075 Before the Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities of the H. Comm. on
Education and Labor, 95th Cong. 66 (1977) (statement of Dorothy Czarnecki).
203. See id. at 63–66; see also ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 197–99.
204. Letter from Marjory Mecklenburg, President of American Citizens Concerned for Life to
Pro-Life Leaders and News Media Representatives (on file with author).
205. School-Age Mother and Child Act, supra note 140, at 501 (quoting National Council of
Churches Study Paper (Mar. 2, 1972)).
206. Legislative History of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Committee on Labor
and Human Resources, 96th Cong. 115–16 (1980) [hereinafter Legislative History of the PDA]
(statement of Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton).
207. See id. at 208–09 (statement of Rep. Ronald Sarasin).
208. Id. at 208.
209. Id. at 185 (statement of Paul E.Tsongas, Massachusetts).
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demand both abortion rights and freedom from sex discrimination. These
attorneys framed meaningful choice as a justification for heightened judicial scrutiny. Feminist litigators also used meaningful choice to expose
understudied connections between equality and liberty for women.
Forced to negotiate in the legislative arena, in the mid-1970s, feminists redefined meaningful choice, playing up connections between poverty, sex equality, and the costs of reproduction. In responding to business lobbyists, feminists also emphasized the language of benefits and
burdens to counter accusations that pregnant women were seeking special treatment.
In the mid-1970s, feminists’ troubled partnership with pro-lifers also transformed arguments about meaningful choice. Pro-life advocates
understood meaningful choice in different terms than did feminists, obscuring any connection between abortion, equality, and liberty. Whereas
many feminists saw protective legislation as a reflection of damaging sex
stereotypes, these antiabortion activists also viewed women as vulnerable
and deserving of protection. Over time, however, some pro-lifers developed a fuller account of why women were vulnerable—one that focused
heavily on sex stereotyping and discrimination. By the later 1970s, some
pro-lifers found more common ground with feminists, favoring the PDA
even if it did not prohibit abortion coverage.
The idea of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA
had radical implications. Women in favor of and opposed to abortion
brought to the surface often-ignored connections between liberty and
equality, presenting protection from sex discrimination as a necessary
precondition for any true exercise of reproductive liberty. Both feminists
and pro-lifers defined choice as much more than freedom from state interference. Indeed, calling for meaningful reproductive choice allowed
activists on either side of the abortion question to navigate difficult questions about “special treatment” and “reverse discrimination” plaguing the
civil rights movement and the women’s movement in the late 1970s.210
By presenting private acts of discrimination—and even poverty—as impermissible burdens on a woman’s reproductive liberty, opposing activists found a powerful new way of demanding economic security for
working women.
Superficially, this understanding of meaningful choice seems consistent with the position taken by most federal courts that employers can
satisfy the PDA by creating pregnancy-blind disability policies.211 Legal
210. On the politics of reverse discrimination in the period, see TERRY H. ANDERSON, THE
PURSUIT OF FAIRNESS: A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 135–57 (2004); NICHOLAS LAHAM,
THE REAGAN PRESIDENCY AND THE POLITICS OF RACE: IN PURSUIT OF COLORBLIND JUSTICE AND
LIMITED GOVERNMENT 20–25 (1998).
211. For a sample of court decisions on pregnancy blindness, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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feminists, pro-life activists, and legislators sympathetic to either group
generally rejected the idea that the PDA created special benefits for
pregnant women. However, the history of arguments for meaningful reproductive choice revealed a more complex legislative purpose underlying the PDA. Meaningful-choice arguments forced Congress to evaluate
pregnant women based on their ability to work rather than the “cause” of
their disability. By penalizing pregnant women for the cause of their disability, employers would impose burdens on women’s reproductive decision-making that other workers completely avoided. Pregnancy-blind
policies impose precisely the kind of harsh burden the framers of the
PDA—and activists on both sides of the abortion question—sought to
prevent.
Why did meaningful reproductive choice arguments fade from view
in the aftermath of the PDA battle? Part II argues that these contentions
lost influence not because of any inherent flaw but because of changes to
the larger political landscape.
II. THE DECLINE OF MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
Since the 1980s, both antiabortion leaders and feminist commentators have pointed out fundamental flaws in the use of choice as a framework for reproductive liberty. Before and after her nomination to the
Supreme Court, Ruth Bader Ginsburg described the privacy rationale for
abortion rights as unconvincing, reasoning that the Court might have
rendered the abortion conflict less intense had it grounded abortion rights
in the Equal Protection Clause.212 Commentators have pointed out that a
privacy rationale laid the foundation for later Supreme Court decisions
upholding bans on abortion funding.213 Historian Rickie Solinger has
argued that a choice framework ratified existing race and class divisions
governing access to reproductive healthcare.214

212. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1198–
99, 1208 (1992) (“[Roe] halted a political process that was moving in a reform direction and thereby
. . . prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue”).
213. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82
YALE L.J. 920, 930 (1973) (arguing that outlawing abortion is not about “governmental snooping”
into citizens’ private lives); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in
Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985) (“Overall, the Court’s Roe position is
weakened, I believe, by the opinion’s concentration on a medically approved autonomy idea, to the
exclusion of a constitutionally based sex-equality perspective.”); Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and
Soul Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right to Abortion, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 329,
331, 371, 373 (2010); Law, supra note 26, at 1020 (“The rhetoric of privacy, as opposed to equality,
blunts our ability to focus on the fact that it is women who are oppressed when abortion is denied. .
. . The rhetoric of privacy also reinforces a public/private dic[h]otomy that is at the heart of the
structures that perpetuate the powerlessness of women.”); Catharine MacKinnon, Roe v. Wade A
Study in Male Ideology, in ABORTION: MORAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 45, 52–53 (Jay L. Garfield & Patricia Hennessey eds., 1984) (criticizing Roe’s emphasis on choice and privacy instead of
equality).
214. See, e.g., RICKIE SOLINGER, BEGGARS AND CHOOSERS: HOW THE POLITICS OF CHOICE
SHAPES ADOPTION, ABORTION, AND WELFARE IN THE UNITED STATES 4–6 (2001).
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This Part contends that choice arguments lost influence in the abortion debate not because of any of the flaws identified by feminist commentators but rather because of a rapidly changing political reality. First,
pro-life arguments for meaningful choice came into growing tension with
the campaign to preserve bans on abortion funding. In the context of
funding bans, antiabortion activists, including those like Mecklenburg,
came to argue that rights to choose guaranteed only freedom from state
interference. Increasingly, the abortion funding issue divided the coalition that had successfully pushed the PDA.
Moreover, as the Part shows next, coalition politics undermined
meaningful-choice reasoning. With the emergence of the New Right and
Religious Right, antiabortion activists allied with partners who rejected
both a strong antidiscrimination policy and a broadening of the social
welfare net. The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan and a slate of pro-life
Republicans reinforced antiabortion activists’ dependence on allies opposed to the central premises of meaningful-choice reasoning.
Finally, as the Part shows, facing setbacks in the Supreme Court,
Congress, the academy, and state legislatures, feminists began searching
for a more constitutionally sound and popularly resonant justification for
abortion rights. As progressives developed what many saw as sounder
defenses of abortion rights, academics and grassroots activists lost sight
of the transformative understandings of choice used in the PDA campaign.
A. The Abortion Funding Battle Divides Supporters of Meaningful Reproductive Choice
In the mid-1970s, as the battle for bans on publicly funded abortion
picked up pace, pro-life legislators and grassroots activists deployed two
key arguments involving a right to choose. First, some activists and politicians charged that taxpayers had a right to conscientiously object to the
funding of what they saw as the “murder [of] the unborn.”215 To some
extent, Representative Henry Hyde (R-IL), the sponsor of an ultimately
successful funding ban, described both poverty and abortion as acute
social injustices:
“Let the poor women of America make a list of those things that society denies them and which are enjoyed by rich women” . . . “Decent housing, decent education, . . . decent income, and then say to
them, ‘Now [sic] those will take second place. But we will encourage
216
you to kill your . . . children.”

Hyde also insisted that poor women had no right to government assistance of any kind. While admitting that he would ban all abortions if
215.
216.

Abortions Should Taxpayers Foot the Bill?, DESERET NEWS, Sept. 29, 1976, at 3A.
Id. (quoting Statement by Rep. Henry J. Hyde).
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he could, Hyde emphasized that the right to choose recognized in Roe in
no way required the State to pay for abortion.217 In the Supreme Court,
attorneys representing Americans United for Life Legal Defense and
Education Fund similarly explained: “If the abortion decision is so private . . . it follows that government should not itself be compelled to respond to the demand of the exercise of that private right . . . .”218 Under
Roe, the state could not interfere with a woman’s decision-making but
had no obligation to fund abortion.219
By 1978, the year Congress passed the PDA, the war over funding
bans had intensified. Congress passed the Hyde Amendment in 1976, and
in 1977, the Supreme Court upheld several similar state laws.220 Almost
as soon as it passed, the Hyde Amendment sparked intense conflict about
exceptions for rape, incest, and health.221 Locked in a constant struggle to
preserve funding bans, pro-lifers like Marjory Mecklenburg retreated
from their earlier positions on meaningful choice.222 In pushing the PDA,
Mecklenburg and the ACCL had defended an idea of choice that required
protection against sex discrimination, going so far as to support a bill that
required employers to give women post-abortion leave.223 By 1978,
Mecklenburg again joined Planned Parenthood in lobbying for an ultimately successful bill, the Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy
Care Act of 1978, requiring state support for both family planning and
for adolescents seeking to bear and raise children.224 This time, however,
Mecklenburg argued that women’s right to meaningful choice did not
extend to abortion access. “‘Freedom to choose’ implies that it is equally
possible for a woman to choose to give birth as well as to abort,” Mecklenburg argued.225 “Today frightened, confused and dependent adolescents often have little freedom to continue a pregnancy unless the kind of
217. See CAROL A. EMMENS, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 68–69 (rev. ed. 1991).
218. Motion and Brief Amicus Curiae of Americans United for Life, Inc. in Support of Petitioner John H. Poelker at 13, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 75-442).
219. See id. at 12–13.
220. For the Supreme Court’s decisions on the public funding of abortion, see Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 470–78 (1977) (upholding a Connecticut Medicaid funding ban on abortion); Poelker
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 420–21 (1977) (sustaining a ban on the use of St. Louis public hospitals for
abortion); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445–54 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania law that limited
Medicaid funding for abortions).
221. Karen De Witt, Foes of Abortion Seek to Tighten Restrictions on Medicaid Funds, N.Y.
TIMES,
at
B20
(Mar.
1,
1979),
http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/120940075/C6EB024E86C94119PQ/1?accounti
d=14608; Martin Tolchin, Financing Bill and Abortion Both Sides Emphasize Questions of ConTIMES,
at
A19
(Oct.
2,
1980),
http://0science,
N.Y.
search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/121031543/752E5F0422104BBEPQ/1?accountid
=14608; Martin Tolchin, On Abortion, the Houses Still Remain Miles Apart, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
1977, at 176.
222. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 200.
223. See id. at 197–99.
224. Adolescent Health, Services, and Pregnancy Prevention and Care Act of 1978 Hearings
on S. 2910 Before the Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong. 433–34 (1978) (statement of Marjory Mecklenburg).
225. Id. at 434.
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services this bill details are readily available.”226 When addressing the
scope of reproductive freedom, however, Mecklenburg concluded that
meaningful choice should not include abortion.227 Reversing an earlier
position, she maintained that the public would not support a meaningfulchoice law if it included abortion services. “If abortion is interjected in
this bill,” argued Mecklenburg, “I believe it will reduce or eliminate its
chances of passage . . . .”228
B. Political Party Realignment Undercuts Support for Meaningful
Choice
Before the late 1970s, both the antiabortion and abortion-rights
movements appealed to politicians and activists across the ideological
spectrum. By the late 1970s, pro-life positions had become a calling card
of grassroots conservatism.229 The mobilization of organizations identifying with the New Right and Religious Right, members of which opposed
abortion, represented a potent new source of allies and political influence
for pro-life leaders.230 Organizations like the Moral Majority and Christian Voice provided much-needed financial support and political connections for a struggling pro-life movement.231 Political operatives frustrated
with the mainstream Republican Party, including Paul Weyrich and
Richard Viguerie, united fragmented single-issue groups, forging a powerful social-conservative coalition.232 By backing Ronald Reagan and
other Republican candidates who endorsed antiabortion positions, prolifers bid for unprecedented political influence.233 Even though many
antiabortion voters had long supported the Democratic Party and contin-

226. Id.
227. See id. at 431.
228. Id.
229. On the growing relationship between the Democratic Party and the women’s movement in
the 1970s and 1980s, see, for example, KIRA SANBONMATSU, DEMOCRATS, REPUBLICANS, AND THE
POLITICS OF WOMEN’S PLACE 64 (2002); LISA YOUNG, FEMINISTS AND PARTY POLITICS 10, 32
(2000).
230. See generally Mary Ziegler, The Possibility of Compromise Antiabortion Moderates
After Roe v. Wade, 1973-1980, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571 (2012).
231. On the emerging alliance between the New Right and Religious Right, see, for example,
DANIEL K. WILLIAMS, GOD’S OWN PARTY: THE MAKING OF THE CHRISTIAN RIGHT 165–74 (2010)
(“As New Right political operatives looked for controversial issues to highlight in their campaigns
against congressional liberals, they turned with increasing frequency to the subject of abortion.”);
Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Before (and After) Roe v. Wade New Questions About Backlash, 120 YALE L.J. 2028, 2060–65 (2011).
232. On the formation of this coalition, see, for example, Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse,
Afterword, in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT’S RULING 259–60 (Reva B. Siegel & Linda Greenhouse eds., 2010).
233. On the importance of Reagan and Republican support to pro-lifers in the period, see, for
example, DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, THE CONSERVATIVE ASCENDANCY: HOW THE GOP RIGHT MADE
POLITICAL HISTORY 148–97 (2007); Cassidy, supra note 90, at 146–48.
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ued to do so well into the 1980s, pro-lifers had more reason than ever to
forge a partnership with the Religious Right and the Republican Party.234
Meaningful-choice arguments no longer fit in the new agenda crafted by the antiabortion movement and its allies. Reagan’s presidential
campaign had popularized neoliberalism, a theory highlighting the merits
of deregulation, welfare cuts, and free markets.235 “Reaganomics” translated these ideas into an overarching economic philosophy.236 When it
came to welfare, Reagan worked with the New Right to reframe dependency as a vice rather than a source of vulnerability.237 New Right politics
promised to shrink the social safety net activists like Mecklenburg had
promoted as a precondition for true reproductive choice.
Whereas pro-lifers had long demanded equal treatment for all dependent Americans, Reagan described dependency as dangerous. In a
1981 speech, Reagan related the story of a victim of the welfare state—a
young woman who “had become so dependent on the welfare check that
she even turned down offers of marriage.”238 Reagan’s story echoed
statements made by the New Right connecting the welfare state and the
decline of the traditional family. A healthy dose of economic selfsufficiency, Reagan suggested, would save the family and revive an ailing economy.239 More importantly, “ideas previously seen as distinctly
conservative had become mainstream.”240 Abortion opponents joined a
political coalition committed to dismantling the welfare state. American
voters appeared increasingly hostile to the idea that welfare counted as a
right for children or anyone else. In this environment, meaningful-choice
arguments lost momentum.
Reagan’s Justice Department also scaled back on antidiscrimination
protections, particularly when those policies required affirmative action.241 While continuing to enforce an existing affirmative-action executive order, Reagan Administration officials filed suit seeking to overturn

234. On the continued loyalty of some pro-life voters toward the Democratic Party into the
1980s, see, for example, DAVID KAROL, PARTY POSITION CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITICS:
COALITION MANAGEMENT 67 (2009).
235. See, e.g., DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND
THE BIRTH OF NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 4–7 (2012).
236. REBECCA DOLHINOW, A JUMBLE OF NEEDS: WOMEN’S ACTIVISM AND NEOLIBERALISM
IN THE COLONIAS OF THE SOUTHWEST 14 (2010).
237. MARISA CHAPPELL, THE WAR ON WELFARE: FAMILY, POVERTY, AND POLITICS IN
MODERN AMERICA 199 (2010).
238. Id. (quoting Statements by President Ronald Reagan (1981)).
239. See Adam Clymer, Reagan Urges Party to Support Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, at 27 (June 25,
1978),
http://0search.proquest.com.bianca.penlib.du.edu/docview/123657465/76E71B388C414A49PQ/1?accounti
d=14608.
240. DANIEL BÉLAND & ALEX WADDAN, THE POLITICS OF POLICY CHANGE: WELFARE,
MEDICARE, AND SOCIAL SECURITY REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES 44 (2012).
241. On the Reagan Administration’s opposition to affirmative action, see ANDERSON, supra
note 210, at 162–85.
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quotas in some fifty affirmative-action decrees.242 Ideologically, administration officials developed a stinging criticism of “special treatment.”243
In 1987, in California Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n. v. Guerra,244 the
Reagan Administration crystallized its position. Guerra asked whether
Title VII preempted any state law requiring employers to provide certain
benefits to pregnant workers.245 In arguing against the California policy,
the Reagan Administration described laws mandating accommodations
for pregnancy as the kind of “reverse discrimination” that Title VII prohibited and that the administration opposed.246 The pro-life movement’s
allies in the New Right and Religious Right strongly opposed affirmative
action.247
Arguments for meaningful choice no longer made sense to a pro-life
movement working so closely with opponents of gender-based affirmative action. When antiabortion activists like Marjory Mecklenburg defended reproductive choice, they demanded protection for pregnant
women and mothers—those they saw as members of a particularly vulnerable and dependent class.248 New Right activists responded that since
women already enjoyed special privileges, antidiscrimination protections
represented a step down, a threat to “conventional culture, established
institutions, and customary social roles.”249 When the antiabortion
movement partnered with the political right, prior commitments to the
expansion of antidiscrimination law seemed profoundly out of step.
C. Feminists Seek Better Justifications for Abortion Rights
As pro-lifers moved away from support for meaningful reproductive
choice, attacks on legal abortion encouraged feminists to develop new
arguments for abortion rights, including claims relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Starting in 1973, legal
academics from across the ideological spectrum attacked the constitu-

242. On the retention of the affirmative-action executive order, see HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM,
COLLISION COURSE: THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND IMMIGRATION
POLICY IN AMERICA 173 (2002). On the effort to eliminate racial quotas from consent decrees, see
ANDREW E. BUSCH, RONALD REAGAN AND THE POLITICS OF FREEDOM 27 (2001).
243. See ANDERSON, supra note 210, at 184.
244. 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Guerra ultimately held that the California law did not violate Title
VII. Id. at 280.
245. Id. at 277–80.
246. RICHARD L. PACELLE, JR., BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND
THE STRUCTURING OF RACE, GENDER, AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS LITIGATION 149, 240–41
(2003).
247. See, e.g., JEROME L. HIMMELSTEIN, TO THE RIGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
CONSERVATISM 83 (1990); LAURA KALMAN, RIGHT STAR RISING: A NEW POLITICS, 1974–1980, at
189, 191–92 (2010).
248. See ZIEGLER, supra note 72, at 197–99.
249. DONALD T. CRITCHLOW, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY AND GRASSROOTS CONSERVATISM: A
WOMAN’S CRUSADE 214 (2005).
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tional underpinnings of the Roe decision.250 Starting with John Hart Ely’s
The Wages of Crying Wolf, legal academics presented the substantive
due process reasoning of Roe as unconvincing, intellectually underwhelming, and even results-oriented.251 By the early 1980s, academic
attacks on Roe prompted a powerful response from legal feminists committed to abortion rights. Commentators from Ruth Bader Ginsburg to
Catherine MacKinnon argued that the problem with Roe lay not in its
recognition of abortion rights but rather in the rationale offered for those
rights.252 As legal feminists worked to develop a better explanation for
abortion rights, the transformative uses of choice that appeared in the
1970s faded from view.253
At least in the 1970s, however, the framers of the PDA (and a variety of laws guaranteeing protections for low-income mothers) advanced
an idea of reproductive choice dramatically at odds with the narrow understanding now linked to the Roe decision. The framers of the PDA
emphasized this idea of meaningful choice, presenting antidiscrimination
law as a crucial protection against reproductive coercion.
Placing the PDA in a broader historical context spotlights the shortcomings of current judicial interpretations of the law. Courts have generally interpreted the PDA to include three interrelated rights: the right to
an individualized judgment of capacity, the right to work if not incapacitated, and the right to whatever accommodations an employer offers
workers who have the same physical capacity to work.254 By contrast,
women have fared poorly when seeking light-duty work or some other
modification that would allow them to work throughout pregnancy.255 As
Joanna Grossman has argued, “The failure of current law to acknowledge
a pregnant woman’s right to work despite temporary, partial impairments
or risks systematically undermines the ability of women to attain workplace equality.”256 As the history of struggles for meaningful choice
250. See Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 3, 21 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
251. See, e.g., Ely, supra note 213, at 940 (arguing that Roe had revived a discredited and
dangerous substantive due process doctrine). For further exploration of criticisms of Roe in the
period, see GARROW, supra note 40, at 609–17 (surveying critical responses to the Roe decision).
252. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Bush v. Gore and the Boundary Between Law and Politics, 110
YALE L.J. 1407, 143–44 (2001); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 821 (1983).
253. Some scholars maintained that privacy or liberty, although not in the form envisioned by
the Roe Court, represented the most promising foundation for abortion rights. See, e.g., Anita Allen,
Allen, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 250,
at 92, 98–107; Jed Rubenfeld, Rubenfeld, J., Concurring in Roe v. Wade and Concluding that the
Writ of Certiorari Should be Dismissed as Improvidently Granted in Doe v. Bolton, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 250, at 109, 118–19.
254. See Grossman, supra note 18, at 607–13.
255. See id. at 570 (“A pregnant woman who seeks to continue working through pregnancy,
but experiences a temporary diminishment or alteration of capacity due to the physical effects of
pregnancy, will encounter limited protection in the law.”).
256. Id. at 621. Part I, supra, discusses this literature at greater length.
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makes apparent, that same failure undermines the idea of reproductive
liberty written into the PDA.
Part III examines how—and how much—Young transformed pregnancy-discrimination jurisprudence. While the Court removed some of
the barriers in the way of individual disparate treatment claims, employers can still impose the kind of burdens on reproductive decision-making
that the PDA was designed to rule out.
III. YOUNG, ACCOMMODATION, AND MEANINGFUL REPRODUCTIVE
CHOICE
The theory of meaningful choice developed by abortion opponents
and legal feminists stands in obvious tension with decisions interpreting
the PDA to require only what the courts call “pregnancy blindness.”
Where does the Supreme Court’s decision in Young leave pregnancyblind policies and meaningful choice more broadly? After briefly laying
out the theory of meaningful reproductive choice underlying the PDA,
this Part begins by examining pre-Young analysis of light-work and other
accommodation requests. Next, the Part explores what Young did and did
not change about the judicial treatment of pregnancy-blind policies. Finally, in the aftermath of Young, the Part considers the best strategy for
advancing the norm of meaningful choice that feminists and antiabortion
activists embraced.
A. The Legislative Constitutional Norm of Meaningful Choice
The story of the PDA underlying the Young litigation spotlights the
importance of what Reva Siegel and Robert Post have called legislative
constitutionalism,257 a process that “delivered what even a more generous
American [juridical] Constitutionalism could not: affirmative rights applicable to private as well as public workplaces.”258 Often, scholars describe the rights created by the PDA as formal-equality protections, that
is, guarantees that pregnant women enjoy protection from stereotyping
and rights to access the benefits employers provide to similarly disabled
employees.259 Understanding the role of meaningful-choice reasoning
reveals a more radical purpose advanced by the framers of the PDA and
their supporters.
It is worth explaining why an idea of choice thoroughly rejected by
the Court gained currency in Congress. While some constitutional rights
require particular remedies or entailments, others “function as values that
257. See generally Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section
Five Power Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943
(2003).
258. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 33 (2010).
259. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 18, at 570; Issacharoff & Rosenblum, supra note 18, at
2204 (describing the PDA as adopting a “formal equality model”).
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courts seek to realize, rather than as principles that mandate specific remedial entailments.”260 Siegel and Post offer the example of judicially
ordered school desegregation orders.261 Although these orders may not be
specifically required by the Equal Protection Clause, they count as a crucial attempt to give it meaning.262 The guarantee of meaningful choice
recognized in the PDA operates in a similar way. While the Court has
made clear that the Constitution protects a woman’s freedom to make
certain reproductive decisions, the Court has found that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires no specific remedial steps to vindicate that right.263
Through the PDA, Congress attempted to work out the meaning of constitutional reproductive choice from the “distinct standpoint of [the] legislature.”264 The story of the PDA makes clear important differences between legislative constitutionalism and the work of the courts and between the reproductive-liberty principles each embraced.
Legislative constitutionalism differs from judicial decision-making
in ways that mattered to the recognition of meaningful reproductive
choice. Because of the case-or-controversy requirement, judicial decisions address only those constitutional questions at stake in the litigation.265 By contrast, Congress can take on larger issues, writing into statutes a more robust vision of what constitutional rights could mean.266 In
particular, Congress can test the distinction between positive and negative rights, creating redistributive remedies.267 Congress effectively experiments with such capacious notions of rights and remedies partly because it can act more cautiously in articulating its constitutional commitments. Legislative constitutionalism can unfold incrementally, setting
forth a principle and developing a remedial scheme over time.268 Crucially, Congress is also democratically accountable, and voters can respond
to any perceived misstep in the articulation of important constitutional
commitments.269

260. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2006.
261. Id. at 2006–07.
262. See id.
263. If anything, the Court’s recent jurisprudence focuses on the permissible burdens states can
place on abortion rights. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)
(“Not all burdens on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will be undue.”).
264. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2007.
265. Id. at 2006.
266. William E. Forbath, The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165, 167 (2001)
(“Congress’s constitutional duties were not only to safeguard the constitutional bounds and fairness
of social and economic legislation, but also to interpret and secure these new positive social and
economic rights.”).
267. See ROBIN WEST, PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: RECONSTRUCTING THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 314–15 (1994); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections
on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 420–22 (1993).
268. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2006–07.
269. See, e.g., KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 182–83 (1999) (“[I]ts constitutional tasks of debate, discussion,
and authorization inevitably make Congress a more deliberative [and] public . . . body.”).
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Key features of legislative constitutionalism made it much more effective for those arguing for meaningful reproductive choice. Courts may
have neither the competence nor the will to fashion redistributive remedies of the kind demanded by some proponents of reproductive choice.270
Judicial precedents establishing a strong tradition of negative constitutionalism do not bind Congress as they do the Court.271 A Congress accountable to the people felt freer to experiment with different ideas of
reproductive choice.
The PDA modified the reasoning underlying meaningful-choice arguments. As its legislative history makes plain, framers of the PDA set
out not only to guarantee women individualized treatment but also to
“put an end to an unrealistic and unfair system that forces women to
choose between family and career.”272 The framers of the PDA described
as coercive disability policies that penalized women for taking pregnancy-related leave.273 As the PDA’s sponsors framed it, these penalties burdened an unquestionably constitutional right—a right for women “to
continu[e] their pregnancy and maintain[] their jobs at the same time.”274
While the courts may not view such policies as unconstitutional, Congress concluded that pregnancy discrimination created an impermissible
burden on women’s reproductive choice.275
Just the same, in passing the PDA, Congress proceeded incrementally, forging a compromise between feminists, pro-lifers, and business
lobbyists. Under the PDA, if the employer chooses to accommodate any
employee, that accommodation must be “administered equally for all
workers in terms of their actual ability to perform work.”276 While employers had no affirmative duty to support a woman’s reproductive decision-making, they could not impose special burdens. As the House Report for the PDA explained, the law required that “pregnant women be
treated the same as other employees on the basis of their ability or inability to work.”277
Although incomplete, the PDA’s original guarantee of meaningful
choice stands in obvious tension with current judicial interpretations of
the law. The federal courts interpret the PDA to require “pregnancy270. Post & Siegel, supra note 257, at 2007 (highlighting “problems of redistribution that
would be quite beyond the bounds of judicial remedies”).
271. Just the same as Gordon Silverstein has argued, judicial decisions shape Congress’s engagement with constitutional issues in unpredictable ways. See GORDON SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S
ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS 35–41, 63–67 (2009).
272. Legislative History of the PDA, supra note 206, at 185 (statement of Paul E. Tsongas).
273. Id. at 203 (statement of Sen. J. Javits).
274. Id. at 202–03 (statement of Sen. J. Javits).
275. See id. at 208–09 (statement of Rep. Ronald A. Sarasin); id. at 178 (statement of Rep.
Baltasar Corrada); id. at 125–27 (statement of Sen. Biden); id. at 208 (statement of Rep. James M.
Jeffords).
276. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 5 (1978).
277. Id. at 4.
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blind[ness].”278 That is, a policy passes muster as long as it “does not
grant or deny light work on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical conditions.”279 Viewed in pure formal-equality terms, pregnancy-blind policies seem valid, since such policies do not appear to single
out pregnancy, at least superficially. Understood in the context of the
liberty norms at work in the PDA, however, pregnancy-blind policies
create just the kind of special burden on women’s reproductive decisionmaking that the PDA attempts to rule out.
The Fifth Circuit first clearly articulated the pregnancy-blindness
defense in 1998, in Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc.280 Mirtha Urbano, a Continental employee, mostly worked as a ticket agent.281 While
she performed a number of tasks, Urbano sometimes had to perform
physical tasks, such as lifting customers’ luggage.282 After learning she
was pregnant, Urbano began experiencing lower back pain and visited
her physician.283 Because she had not been injured on the job, Continental found Urbano ineligible for a light-work assignment, forcing her to
exhaust her family leave and go without pay.284 Urbano brought suit under Title VII.285
Several years earlier, the Sixth Circuit found that a similar lightduty policy violated the PDA, since the law expressly required “that employers provide the same treatment of such individuals as provided for
‘other persons . . . similar in their ability or inability to work.’”286 The
Urbano Court disagreed.287 The formal terms of the employer’s policy,
not its substantive effect, dictated the court’s analysis.288 Unless Urbano
could show that Continental’s policy was a “pretext for discrimination
against pregnant women or that it had a disparate impact on them,” the
policy satisfied Title VII.289 The Fifth Circuit suggested that Title VII
might mandate pregnancy blindness since a contrary “policy would treat
a male employee ‘in a manner which but for that person’s sex would be
different.’”290

278. See Widiss, supra note 18, at 964, 1022.
279. Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated by Young v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
280. 138 F.3d 204, 206–08 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
281. Id. at 205.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Ensley-Gaines v. Runyon, 100 F.3d 1220, 1226 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(k) (2012)).
287. Urbano, 138 F.3d at 207–08.
288. See id.
289. See id.
290. Id. at 208 n.2 (quoting Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 683 (1983)).
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The Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young elaborated on the justification for pregnancy blindness under the PDA. Peggy Young began working for UPS in 1999, and by 2002, she had secured a position driving a
delivery truck.291 By 2006, Young had shifted to a part-time position as
an air driver, working in the early morning and picking up packages delivered by air carrier the night before.292 In July 2006, after two rounds of
unsuccessful in vitro fertilization, Young received leave from her employer to try a third time.293 When she finally became pregnant, several
doctors told her not to lift more than twenty pounds for the first twenty
weeks of her pregnancy.294 Armed with her doctors’ advice, Young requested a light-work accommodation.295
As a matter of official policy, UPS’s applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement allowed accommodation only when workers were injured
on the job or when employees had a disability cognizable under the
ADA.296 UPS’s occupational health specialist, Cynthia Martin, concluded
that Young’s pregnancy did not warrant ADA protection and had not
occurred on the job, and as a result, Martin denied Young’s request.297 In
November, when refused again by UPS’s Capitol Division Manager,
Young had to exhaust her leave under the Family Medical Leave Act.298
Between November 2006 and 2007, Young received no pay and eventually lost her medical coverage. 299 After April 2007, when she gave birth,
she returned to work, filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).300 Young alleged race
and sex discrimination under Title VII, as well as disability discrimination under the ADA.301
In rejecting Young’s claim, the Fourth Circuit zeroed in on the second clause of the PDA, which provides, “women affected by pregnancy
. . . shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes . . . as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to
work.”302 While acknowledging that the second clause of the PDA
seemed clear on its face, the Fourth Circuit tried to reconcile it with the
first clause.303 “Although the second clause can be read broadly,” the
court explained, “we conclude that its placement in the definitional sec291.
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young I), 707 F.3d 437, 440 (4th Cir. 2013), amended
and superseded by Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 784 F.3d 192, subsequent determination,
2015 WL 2058940 (2015).
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 440–41.
296. Id. at 439–40.
297. Id. at 440–41.
298. Id. at 441.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 442.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 447–48 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012)).
303. See id. at 447–49.
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tion of Title VII, and grounding within the confines of sex discrimination
under § 703, make clear that it does not create a distinct and independent
cause of action.”304 To do otherwise, as the court reasoned, would make
pregnant workers a favored class, receiving special treatment other employees did not receive.305
The same reasoning informed the court’s analysis of Young’s
McDonnell-Douglas claim. “Under this framework, Young must establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination on her pregnancy claim by
showing ‘(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) adverse employment action; and (4) that similarlysituated employees outside the protected class received more favorable
treatment.’”306
The court focused on the fourth element—particularly, who counted
as an appropriate comparator.307 Young urged the court to compare her to
other workers similarly able to perform certain on-the-job tasks.308 By
contrast, UPS primarily analyzed the source of different workers’ disability.309 As the court explained, “Young is not similar to employees injured
on the job because, quite simply, her inability to work does not arise
from an on-the-job injury.”310 Finding that Young had not presented
enough evidence of circumstances “giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination,” the court rejected her PDA claim.311
B. Pregnancy Blindness After Young
In vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Young, the Supreme
Court tried to carve out a middle-ground position that differed from the
stands taken by both UPS and the Fourth Circuit on the one hand and
Peggy Young on the other.312 The dispute turned on the meaning of the
second clause of the PDA, which states that pregnant workers shall be
treated the same “as other persons not so affected but similar in their
ability or inability to work.”313 Young argued that “[t]he PDA . . . seeks
to ensure that ‘women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not be forced to choose between having a child and having a
job.’”314 In Young’s reading, the second clause did not require courts to
set aside a conventional disparate-treatment analysis but did mandate that
judges identifying a discriminatory intent compare pregnant workers to
304. Id. at 447.
305. Id. at 448.
306. Id. at 449–50 (quoting Gerner v. Cty. of Chesterfield, 674 F.3d 264, 266 (4th Cir. 2012)).
307. See id. at 450–51.
308. See id. at 450.
309. See id. at 450–51.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 451 (quoting Mackey v. Shalala, 360 F.3d 463, 468 (4th Cir. 2004)).
312. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young II), 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1352–54 (2015).
313. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012); see also Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1352–54.
314. Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 11, at 19–20 (quoting International Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991)).
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others with a similar capacity to do a job, regardless of the source of their
disability.315 Amici representing a variety of women’s rights and civil
rights groups went further, arguing that “[t]he text of the Second Clause
leaves no room for a distinction based on the source of the condition to
masquerade as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason.”316 By contrast,
UPS argued that the second clause simply reaffirmed that pregnant
workers counted among the protected classes covered by Title VII and
said nothing about whether employers could accommodate some workers
while leaving pregnant employees out.317 In individual disparatetreatment analysis, courts were free to compare pregnant workers to others on the basis of disability.318 If UPS excluded all employees not injured on the job, the company would necessarily comply with the
PDA.319
Writing for a 6-3 majority, Justice Breyer found none of these interpretations persuasive. Like the lower courts, the majority found that
Young’s interpretation would “grant[] pregnant workers a ‘most-favorednation’ status.”320 With little analysis of the purpose or history of the
PDA, the Court dismissed the idea that Congress would have intended to
mandate equal treatment of pregnant workers “irrespective of the nature
of their jobs, the employer’s need to keep them working, their ages, or
any other criteria.”321 In reaching this result, the majority relied on language in the House and Senate Reports, which stated in pertinent part
that the PDA “reestablish[ed] the law as it was understood prior to” the
Gilbert decision in 1976.322 Since the Court applied the McDonnellDouglas framework prior to Gilbert, the majority concluded that employers could deny pregnant workers accommodations as long as they
had “a legitimate, non-discriminatory, nonpretextual reason for doing
so.”323
Nor did the majority find that the text of the PDA required a different interpretation. The second clause compared pregnant workers to
“other persons” similarly unable to work.324 Because the clause did “not
say that the employer must treat pregnant employees the ‘same’ as
‘any other persons’ (who are similar in their ability or inability to work),

315. See id. at 20–21.
316. Brief of Law Professors and Women’s and Civil Rights Organization as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner at 24, Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 [hereinafter Brief for Law Professors] (No. 121226).
317. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 11–12.
318. See id. at 14.
319. See id. at 11–12.
320. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1349.
321. Id. at 1349–50.
322. Id. at 1350 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 8 (1978)).
323. See id.
324. Id. at 1348.
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[or] . . . specify which other persons Congress had in mind,” the majority
found Young’s reading unpersuasive.325
However, the majority found UPS’s interpretation of the second
clause equally unconvincing. As Justice Breyer explained, Congress intended to overrule both the holding and reasoning of Gilbert.326 UPS’s
reading would do nothing to a core premise of the Gilbert decision—
“that an employer can treat pregnancy less favorably than diseases or
disabilities resulting in a similar inability to work.”327
The Young majority further outlined what a worker could do to succeed in an individual disparate-treatment claim.328 At the prima facie
case stage, a worker could prove “that she belongs to the protected class,
that she sought accommodation, that the employer did not accommodate
her, and that the employer did accommodate others ‘similar in their ability or inability to work.’”329 If the employer offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the exclusion, a worker could raise an inference of
pretext by showing that a policy created “a significant burden on pregnant workers, and that the employer’s ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’
reasons are not sufficiently strong to justify the burden.”330 To show a
material issue of fact as to whether a burden exists, a worker could
demonstrate that “the employer accommodates a large percentage of
nonpregnant workers while failing to accommodate a large percentage of
pregnant workers.”331
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Alito analyzed in greater depth
to whom pregnant workers could be compared as part of individual disparate-treatment analysis.332 Alito concluded that “pregnant employees
must be compared with employees performing the same or very similar
jobs.”333 Alito also offered some clues about how such a comparison
would unfold by analyzing one of UPS’s accommodations.334 The company had accommodated drivers who lost their DOT certification.335 UPS
and the Fourth Circuit distinguished pregnant workers from those accommodated on two bases. First, workers who lost DOT certification
faced a legal obstacle while pregnant workers did not.336 Second, workers
without DOT certification theoretically still had the ability to perform a
variety of physical tasks that pregnant women requiring accommodation
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id. at 1349–50.
Id. at 1353.
Id.
Id. at 1353–54.
Id. at 1354.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 1357–59 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 1357–58.
See id. at 1360–61.
Id. at 1360.
See id.
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did not.337 For Alito, neither of these distinctions made sense.338 At least
on some occasions, workers losing DOT certification would have the
same incapacity to work as pregnant employees.339 UPS offered no explanation as to why pregnant drivers did not receive accommodations
afforded to other workers.340
Where do pregnancy-blind policies stand in the aftermath of Young?
This Part next explores the impact of Young on three strategies available
to pregnant workers: those involving disparate treatment, disparate impact, and disability under the ADA. By providing a partial roadmap for
workers challenging pregnancy-blind policies, Young will make it easier
to bring disparate-treatment claims. At the same time, by reinforcing the
idea that providing workers meaningful choice constitutes impermissible
“special treatment,” Young exposes the persistent disadvantages of using
litigation to protect pregnant workers.
C. Individual Disparate Treatment Claims
After Young, employees will most likely challenge pregnancy-blind
policies using either direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. In direct-evidence cases,341 employees have conventionally (and unsuccessfully) turned to light-work policies themselves as proof of discriminatory
intent.342 The logic here is straightforward: employers use light-work
policies that, by their very terms, exclude all pregnant women from accommodations available to employees similarly able (or unable) to work.
Prior to Young, the circuit courts refuted this logic by relying on a narrow
definition of who counts as a proper comparator for pregnant women.343
In particular, courts compare pregnant women to other workers on the
basis of the source of their injury or disability, rather than their capacity
to work. On their face, pregnancy-blind policies treat pregnant women
the same as all other workers not injured on the job or not considered
disabled under the terms of the ADA.
Young is silent on whether pregnancy-blind policies can ever qualify as direct evidence of discrimination, but the logic of the majority opin337. See id.
338. See id. at 1360–61.
339. See id.
340. Id. at 1361.
341. See, e.g., Jones v. Res-Care, Inc., 613 F.3d 665, 671 (7th Cir. 2010).
342. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 548–49 (7th Cir. 2011),
abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641 (6th Cir.
2006), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Spivey v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 196 F.3d 1309,
1312–13 (11th Cir. 1999), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338; Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc.,
138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
343. See, e.g., Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 548–49 (upholding a pregnancy-blind policy because it
treated pregnant workers the same as non-pregnant employees not injured on the job); Spivey, 196
F.3d at 1312–13 (upholding a pregnancy-blind policy because it treated pregnant workers the same
as non-pregnant employees not injured on the job); Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206 (upholding a pregnancy-blind policy because it treated pregnant workers the same as non-pregnant employees not injured
on the job).
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ion stands in obvious tension with this argument. The Court explicitly
allowed the employer to accommodate some workers with an identical
inability to work while excluding pregnant workers so long as employers
had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for doing so.344 Under Young,
without more, a policy denying accommodation to pregnant workers
would likely not constitute direct evidence of discrimination. The fact of
the discrimination would not change the analysis. What matters under
Young is the employer’s motivation and intent.345
Young will make a greater difference to the courts’ analysis under
the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. In the lower courts,
the central problem in light-work cases has involved the final element:
whether denying light work to pregnant women creates a special burden
or whether granting pregnant women light work constitutes special
treatment.346
Before Young, courts answering this question focused on who
counts as a relevant comparator—a person “similarly situated” or nearly
identical to a pregnant woman whom an employer treats more favorably.347 Workers ask the court to compare workers in terms of their ability
to do a job, while employers ask the courts to spotlight the cause of a
worker’s disability.348 Again, for the most part, the courts endorsed the
latter position.349
On the rare occasions that women made it past the prima facie
stage, employees tried to show that an employer’s purportedly neutral
reason for using a pregnancy-blind policy was a pretext for sex discrimination.350 Before Young, proving pretext was hard. The Sixth Circuit
rejected a PDA challenge because the employee lacked strong enough
evidence that employers had adopted a pregnancy-blind policy for discriminatory reasons.351 Establishing such an evidentiary foundation was
often likely to be difficult and expensive. Employees might need to conduct “an examination of how the policy came to be enacted and why,” to
locate “evidence about women’s status generally within the employer’s
ranks,” and to conduct “interviews . . . [of] current and past employees
about employer attitudes concerning pregnancy or women in the workplace.”352 As Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas recognize, however,

344. Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1354.
345. See id.
346. See Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 36–37.
347. See id. at 37.
348. See, e.g., id. For examples of decisions on this point, see, e.g., Spivey, 196 F.3d at 1313;
Urbano, 138 F.3d at 206.
349. See, e.g., Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 36–37.
350. See, e.g., Reeves v. Swift Transp. Co., 446 F.3d 637, 641–42 (6th Cir. 2006), abrogated
by Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338.
351. Id.
352. Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 40–41.
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even workers who can bring forth this kind of evidence must counter
arguments that they demand “special treatment.”353
Young provides some reassurance for pregnant workers proceeding
under McDonnell-Douglas. To make out a prima facie case, Young made
clear that workers needed only to show that the employer accommodated
other workers similar in their inability to work. If an employer adopts a
pregnancy-blind policy that accommodates nonpregnant workers with
similar physical disabilities, most lower courts would have rejected a
disparate treatment claim out of hand. After Young, if an employer uses a
similar pregnancy-blind policy, a worker should make it to the last step
of the burden-shifting analysis.
Young also makes it easier for pregnant workers to show pretext.
Both the majority and Justice Alito’s concurrence draw attention to the
impact of an exclusionary policy and the stated reasons for it. If a policy
excluded most pregnant workers while covering all others, the majority
reasoned that a jury could reasonably infer a discriminatory intent, particularly when the employer’s justification did not seem strong enough to
rationalize such a significant impact.354 Under Justice Alito’s approach,
courts applying the burden-shifting framework would compare pregnant
workers to others assigned the same job and similar in their inability to
work. Alito’s skepticism about UPS’s accommodation of workers who
lost their DOT certification stemmed from the kind of mismatch between
the employer’s stated means and ends that troubled the majority. At least
some of the time, pregnant workers and drivers without DOT certification could perform the same tasks. For Alito, UPS had simply not offered
a good enough reason for providing an accommodation to the latter
group of workers while denying one to the former.
Just the same, after Young, real obstacles still stand in the way of
pregnant workers relying on individual disparate treatment. The majority’s reasoning presupposes that there are nondiscriminatory reasons for
treating pregnant workers differently beyond their inability to perform
certain tasks.355 The Court specifically mentioned distinctions based on
“special duties, special service, or special needs,” but left the door open
for employers to identify more nondiscriminatory reasons to single out
pregnant workers.356 As a result, Young still allows employers to circumvent the principle of meaningful choice written into the PDA. Under the
PDA, after choosing to accommodate any employee, the employer can
exclude pregnant workers only if they differ from others in their inability
to perform certain tasks. By allowing employers more room to exclude

353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. at 41.
Young II, 135 S. Ct. at 1354–55.
See id. at 1354.
Id. at 1350.
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pregnant workers, Young still does too little to guard against the burdens
on reproductive decision-making targeted by the PDA.
To defeat a plaintiff’s claim at the summary judgment stage after
Young, an employer may simply have to offer a persuasive reason for
leaving pregnant workers out. The majority countenanced the possibility
that some pregnancy-blind policies—including UPS’s own rules—would
pass muster.357 Young makes clear that as a policy more heavily burdens
pregnant women, employers must bring forth more persuasive reasons
for discriminating.358 However, the burden on pregnant workers is relative. If employers exclude all pregnant workers and many nonpregnant
workers, the kind of significant burden that the Young Court describes
may not exist. Even a burden as onerous as the one created by UPS may
still survive as long as the employer makes a sufficiently compelling
argument for it. Theoretically, employers could have good reason to reward only those injured on the job for the hazard incurred during service.
Accommodations for those injured on the job effectively exclude all
pregnant women, but under Young, such a defect may not be fatal. For
Justice Alito, a pregnancy-blind policy excluding workers who do not
have a disability under the ADA would present no problem under the
PDA.359 After Young, pregnancy-blind policies will less often absolve
employers of responsibility for pregnancy discrimination. However, given the circuit courts’ receptivity to these policies, Young still allows employers to treat pregnant workers differently because of the source of
their disability—their pregnancy.
Worse, Young reinforced the “most-favored-nation” reasoning underlying the lower courts’ treatment of pregnancy-blind policies.360 Both
the majority and concurrence reasoned that the PDA could not require
employers to treat pregnant women the same as others based on their
inability to work without requiring the kind of special treatment Title VII
prohibits.361
The reproductive-liberty analysis favored by feminists and pro-lifers
in the 1970s may help workers overcome the hurdles created by Young.
Presenting the law as a protection against special burdens on reproductive liberty gave both movement and countermovement activists in the
1970s a way out of the reverse-discrimination dilemma. Activists successfully reframed the PDA as a protection against special burdens on
women’s reproductive liberty rather than a guarantee of preferential
treatment.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

See id.
See id. at 1354.
Id. at 1360–61 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id. at 1349–50 (majority opinion); id. at 1357–59 (Alito, J., concurring).
See id. at 1349–50 (majority opinion); id. at 1357–59 (Alito, J., concurring).
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Now, reviving the liberty analysis used in the PDA debate may also
help the courts understand individual disparate treatment analysis in different terms. Under Young, at the pretext stage, the courts effectively
balance competing considerations, evaluating the strength of an employer’s justification against the impact a policy has on pregnant women.
That impact should include not only the number of women affected by a
policy but also the burden on reproductive decision-making that a policy
imposes. Giving employers an out so long as they exclude a sufficient
number of nonpregnant workers does nothing to remedy the special burden prohibited by the PDA. Nor should many justifications for excluding
pregnant workers be considered sufficiently weighty to justify the reproductive burden inherent in pregnancy-blind policies. To define comparators too narrowly would once again ensure, contrary to the intent of the
PDA, that “women workers would face serious obstacles to continuing
their pregnancy and maintaining their jobs at the same time.”362
Justice Alito suggested that UPS’s policy of accommodating only
disabled employees would likely qualify as a sufficient, nondiscriminatory purpose under Young.363 However, the majority mentioned that the
Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act of 2008 might change the
courts’ analysis of whether pregnancy itself may constitute a disability.
This Part turns next to the disability-discrimination challenges that may
be available to pregnant workers after Young.
D. Pregnancy as a Disability Under the ADAAA
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of qualified disability status and demands that employers provide “reasonable accommodations” for qualified individuals unless doing so would impose an “undue
hardship.”364 The ADA treats an individual as disabled when she either
has or is regarded as having “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual.”365
After the Supreme Court substantially narrowed the definition of a qualifying disability, Congress responded by enacting the 2008 ADA
Amendments Act (ADAAA).366 The ADAAA clarified that the statutory
definition of disability should be “construed in favor of broad coverage”
and explicitly repudiated the Court’s prior interpretations.367 The
ADAAA also required a court to treat a condition as a disability regardless of the effect of mitigating measures, such as medication or hearing

362. 124 CONG. REC. 36,818 (1978).
363. See Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1360 (Alito, J., concurring).
364. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012).
365. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012).
366. Widiss, supra note 18, at 1006.
367. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA) §§ 2, 4, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(a)–(e) (2012);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(iii) (2012) (“[T]he threshold issue of whether an impairment ‘substantially limits’ a major life activity should not demand extensive analysis.”).
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aids, and regardless of the fact that a condition was episodic or in remission.368
As Jeannette Cox has shown, the ADAAA provides a strong foundation for efforts to define “normal” pregnancy, and not just pregnancy
complications, as a disability.369 The ADAAA makes explicit that “impairment[s]” that cause “substantial” limitations in “walking, standing,
. . . lifting, [or] bending” qualify as disabilities.370
Although the ADAAA has significantly expanded the definition of a
disability, the few courts to consider the issue have responded with ambivalence to claims that “normal” or even “abnormal” pregnancy counts
as a qualified disability.371 Consider, for example, the case of Victoria
Serednyj, an activity director at a nursing home operated by Beverly
Healthcare, LLC (Beverly).372 Serednyj’s job sometimes required her to
perform physical tasks, like rearranging chairs, transporting residents to
activities, or carrying shopping bags.373 Serednyj had previously suffered
a miscarriage, and when she became pregnant again, she had complications that required her to avoid strenuous physical labor.374 Her employer
refused to transfer her to a light-duty position because she had not been
injured on the job.375
Serednyj argued, among other things, that Beverly’s failure to grant
her request constituted both disability discrimination and a failure to accommodate under the ADA, since her pregnancy prevented her from
doing daily tasks like bending and lifting.376 While acknowledging that
pregnancy may count as a physical impairment, the Seventh Circuit concluded that Serednyj could not show that her impairment “substantially
limited” a “major life activity.”377 Finding that “[p]regnancy is, by its
very nature, of limited duration” and that “any complications which arise
from a pregnancy generally dissipate once a woman gives birth,” the
Seventh Circuit rejected Serednyj’s claim.378 Regardless of the impact of
the ADAAA, as Serednyj shows, courts may reject any disability claim
based on the fact that pregnancy and its complications have only a temporary effect.

368. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A)–(E) (2009).
369. Jeannette Cox, Pregnancy as “Disability” and the Amended Americans with Disabilities
Act, 53 B.C. L. Rev. 443, 444–45 (2012).
370. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i), (j)(1)(viii–ix) (2012).
371. See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Heathcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 554–57 (7th Cir. 2011);
Payne v. State Student Assistance Comm., No. 1:07–cv–0981–DFH–JMS, 2009 WL 1468610, at *3
(S.D. Ind. May 22, 2009).
372. Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 545.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 545–46.
375. Id. at 546–47.
376. See id. at 552.
377. See id. at 554–56.
378. Id.
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Young itself offers few clues about how the Court would view
claims that pregnancy would constitute a disability after the ADA
Amendments Act. Just the same, the history provided here bolsters Cox’s
analysis. During the battle for the PDA, business lobbyists urged Congress to distinguish “normal” pregnancy from other disabilities because it
was temporary and (at least often) voluntary. Reproductive-liberty analysis allowed legislators to see through this argument. Assume that an employer wishes to accommodate only nonpregnant workers. She can do so
as long as she does not formally categorize workers on the basis of pregnancy or related conditions. Achieving the same result—excluding pregnant workers from generally available accommodations—would be easy.
Accommodating only workers injured on the job effectively disqualifies
any pregnancy-based request, since women rarely conceive at work. To
be sure, the PDA did not require employers who provided no accommodations to do so for pregnant employees.379 However, as the Article
shows, the diverse constituencies supporting the PDA did demand that
pregnant women be judged on their ability to work, not their pregnancy—the “source” of their disability. Ignoring this consensus allows employers to burden women’s reproductive decisions in precisely the way
the PDA forbids.
E. Disparate Impact Claims
Joanna Grossman and Gillian Thomas point to the promise of disparate impact claims for women challenging pregnancy-blind policies.380
Because the plaintiff did not explicitly pursue such a claim, Young did
not consider the merits of such a strategy. To make out a prima facie
case, workers must show a specific and identifiable employment practice
(here, a pregnancy-blind policy) that had a statistically significant effect
on a protected class.381 As Grossman and Thomas recognize, the courts
appear to have loosened the evidentiary burden in the light-duty context,
allowing pregnant workers to rely on general statistics about “the number
of women who can be expected to become pregnant during their working
lives . . . as well as the extensive literature concerning pregnancy’s physical effects.”382
However, the disparate-impact theory mostly remains untested,
since courts have not yet fully addressed the employer’s business necessity defense: that is, whether pregnancy-blind policies are job-related and
serve a business necessity.383 Grossman and Thomas convincingly argue
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See 123 CONG. REC. 29,660 (1977).
Grossman & Thomas, supra note 13, at 41–49.
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against several likely defenses, including claims based on cost and the
volume of available, “real” light work.384
However, the biggest problem with disparate impact claims may lie
in the “special treatment” trap set by early opponents of the PDA and
reinforced by the Young majority. The Urbano Court concluded that Title VII forbids all policies that are not pregnancy blind.385 By granting
women a benefit that men could not receive, as the courts concluded, the
employer may discriminate on the basis of sex.386 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Ricci v. DeStefano387 reinforces this analysis of pregnancybased accommodations. Although decided in the context of race discrimination, Ricci expressed skepticism about the legality of affirmative efforts on the part of the employer to address disparate impacts, particularly when those efforts resemble “reverse discrimination.”388 In that case,
the City of New Haven set aside the results of a written test for the promotion of city firefighters since it had a racially disparate impact.389 Applying the strong-basis-in-the-evidence standard from equal-protection
jurisprudence, the Court held that New Haven’s decision constituted impermissible treatment under Title VII.390
Scholars read Ricci in a variety of ways: from suggesting that the
Court requires color- (or pregnancy-) blindness in all but the rarest cases
to arguing that Ricci creates a new defense for employers in disparateimpact cases who were not aware that a policy would have a disparate
impact.391 What seems clear is that Ricci narrowed the scope of disparate-impact claims, providing a powerful weapon for those who frame
pregnancy accommodation as special treatment. On its face, Young offers
little comfort to those relying on a disparate-impact theory. The majority
and concurrence give ammunition to employers framing requests for
accommodations as demands for “most-favored nation status.”
The liberty analysis set forth here may help strengthen the case for
disparate impact in a post-Ricci world. In debate surrounding the PDA,
feminists and pro-lifers convinced members of Congress that demands
384. See id. at 47–49.
385. Urbano v. Cont'l. Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 208 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1998), abrogated by
Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. (Young II), 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015).
386. See id.
387. 557 U.S. 557 (2009).
388. See Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1341, 1343–44
(2010) (discussing the constitutional implications of Ricci); Amy L. Wax, Disparate Impact Realism, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 621, 675 (2011) (explaining that Ricci “casts doubt on the legality of
the disparate impact doctrine”).
389. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561–62.
390. See id. at 584–87.
391. See, e.g., Ian Haney–López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1871–74
(2012) (using Ricci as evidence that “[t]he Roberts Court seems determined to fully enforce past
colorblind reasoning—indeed, to expand its reach”); Primus, supra note 388, at 1363–75 (canvassing other interpretations of Ricci); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword Equality Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1, 58 (2013) (arguing that Ricci allowed “majority plaintiffs to challenge a civil rights law by standards not available to minority plaintiffs challenging the criminal law”).
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for “special treatment” in fact constituted calls for protection against the
unique burdens imposed on women balancing childbearing and careers.
The federal courts—and the Supreme Court—should overrule decisions relying on the principle of pregnancy blindness. The history of the
PDA makes clear that it requires much more. Just the same, as the Part
next explains, the courts may not be the most promising place to challenge pregnancy-blind policies.
F. The Return to Legislative Constitutionalism
The history of the battle for meaningful choice illustrates not only
the constitutional values realized by the PDA but also the shortcomings
of litigation as a tool for seeking accommodations for pregnant workers.
Because of courts’ reliance on precedent, judicial decision-making remains more path-dependent.392 As a conservative plurality on the Supreme Court reads color-blindness into the Equal Protection Clause,
courts are more likely to view Title VII as a guarantee of sex and pregnancy blindness—one centered on formal equality and fundamentally
opposed to any accommodations. The Young Court’s hostility to “special
treatment” ignores the meaning and history of the PDA, but the Court’s
discomfort with the very idea of accommodation flows naturally from
recent Equal Protection and Title VII jurisprudence.
Congress’s institutional advantages—an ability to work incrementally, democratic accountability, and the capacity to create redistributive
remedies—make the legislative arena a more promising place for contemporary proponents of meaningful choice. Superficially, Congress may
not seem to be a promising place to do much of anything. Defined by
gridlock, partisan polarization, and astonishingly low poll ratings, Congress seems unlikely to advance any legislative agenda, let alone one
related to either equality or liberty.393
Moreover, an accommodation-centered policy has drawbacks of its
own. Some scholars worry that an accommodation-centered policy
would reinforce gender-paternalist attitudes or encourage employers to
avoid hiring women in the first place.394 Michael Selmi, for example, has
392. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 605 (2001) (noting that judicial
decisions are “path dependen[t]” in the sense “that courts’ early resolutions of legal issues can become locked-in and resistant to change” due to a variety of factors, including stare decisis, even
when change in legal rules is needed “to respond to changing underlying conditions”).
393. This Congress is the most gridlocked in history. See Jonathan Weisman, In Congress,
Gridlock
and
Harsh
Consequences,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jul.
7,
2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/08/us/politics/in-congress-gridlock-and-harshconsequences.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“At this time in 2011, Congress had passed 23 laws on
the way toward the lowest total since those numbers began being tracked in 1948.”).
394. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, Work and Family The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of
Discrimination Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 115
(1989) (expressing concern that accommodation might “simply reconstitute [women’s] role in a new
and more oppressive patriarchy”); Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace,
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argued that disparate-impact theory, an approach sympathetic to accommodation rights, has “stunted the evolution of a more robust definition of
intentional discrimination.”395 Samuel Bagenstos contends that broad,
structural, accommodation-centered remedies lack the “generally accepted normative underpinnings of antidiscrimination law.”396
However, as the history presented here makes clear, the PDA mattered to members of Congress and grassroots supporters because it
helped to give meaning to important constitutional values surrounding
reproductive liberty. As Joanna Grossman argues, an accommodation
regime would “create a counter-narrative of a woman’s proper place.”397
As importantly, an accommodation law would more accurately reflect
the movement–countermovement consensus on reproductive liberty that
emerged in debate on the PDA. A new legislative constitutional campaign might represent the next logical step in the expression of those
values.
At a minimum, grassroots activists could pursue an amendment to
the PDA prohibiting discrimination by pregnancy-blind policies. More
ambitiously, feminists and antiabortion activists could pursue legislation
like the proposed federal Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA), a law
that would force employers to make reasonable accommodations for
pregnant workers much like those employers must make available to the
disabled.398 The PWFA would make it unlawful for employers to deny
accommodation to pregnant women unless doing so would represent an
“undue hardship.”399 Seven states have already passed such accommodation legislation, as have some local governments like the New York City
Council.400
Legislative constitutionalism may well be the most promising path
for legislators and grassroots activists who want to give further meaning
24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 283, 327–28 (2003) (noting that a mandate to accommodate caregiving obligations could “translate into paternalism, as the beneficiaries are viewed as uniquely in
need of extra assistance or protection. Paternalism, like resentment, could lead to further limits on
women's opportunities and roles.” (footnote omitted)).
395. Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 701,
781 (2006).
396. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006).
397. Grossman, supra note 18, at 625.
398. Co-sponsored by members of Congress on either side of the abortion issue, the bill has
been introduced in both the 113th and 112th Congress but has not been moved beyond committee in
either the House or the Senate. See Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 942, 113th Cong. (2013);
Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, S. 3565, 112th Cong. (2012); Pregnant Workers Fairness Act, H.R.
5647, 112th Cong. (2012).
399. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
400. See, e.g., Sean P. Lynch, Philadelphia Enacts Pregnancy Accommodation Law, NAT’L. L.
REV. (Feb. 11, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/philadelphia-enacts-pregnancyaccommodation-law (summarizing state laws passed). For discussion of the New York City law, see,
for example, Rachel L. Swarns, Placed on Unpaid Leave, a Pregnant Employee Finds Hope in a
New Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/03/nyregion/suspended-forbeing-pregnant-an-employee-finds-hope-in-a-new-law.html.
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to the reproductive-liberty norm written into the PDA. Legislative constitutionalism allowed feminists and antiabortion activists to make gradual
progress in the realization of their constitutional commitments. Fundamentally, however, legal feminists and pro-lifers in the PDA battle concluded that women required accommodation, not equal treatment, to exercise true reproductive liberty. The PDA requires only that employers
treat pregnant women the same as other workers with similar physical
limitations. A hirer can circumvent the PDA by providing no accommodations at all. Obviously, such a policy may force a woman to choose
between economic security and childbearing. So too may pregnancyblind policies. Indeed, amici on either side of the abortion issue recognized the purpose of the PDA and unsuccessfully urged the Court to require employers to accommodate workers equally based on their inability
to work rather than the source of their disability.401 To give meaning to
the values embraced by the PDA, activists may have to turn once again
to the legislative arena.
CONCLUSION
Arguments for reproductive choice have few supporters, but widespread criticism of choice-based arguments in the courts has obscured
their transformative potential. Dissatisfied with juridical constitutionalism, grassroots groups on either side of the abortion issue turned to Congress in expressing their constitutional commitments. Choice served as
the touchstone of demands to analyze reproductive liberty and sex
equality as inextricably linked—demands that blurred the distinction
between negative and positive rights. The PDA emerged from debate
between antiabortion activists, feminists, and business lobbyists about
the meaning of the right to choose and the remedies appropriate for violations of that right. The law represented an incremental step on the path
to guaranteeing women meaningful, rather than formal, reproductive
choice.
Tracing the history of liberty norms and the PDA calls into question
prevailing judicial interpretations of the protections the statute requires—
including the Court’s analysis in Young. But perhaps the fact that courts
have relied on so narrow an interpretation of Title VII should come as no
surprise. Now as before, for those seeking workplace fairness, the courts
may not be the best place to look.
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Young II, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (No. 12-1226); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Civil Liberties
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